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ABSTRACT 
When people read traditional text-based stories, they construct mental representations of 
the described state of affairs, called situation models, to connect various details of events 
(e.g., time, space, entity) in memory (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). According to the 
cognitive theory of multimedia learning (Mayer, 2005; 2011), stories presented as 
pictures and text generate independent channels of mental representations that can work 
hand-in-hand or separately to acquire and remember the materials presented. This 
dissertation consisted of two experiments that were used to further explore how the two 
modalities affect what is being mentally represented in memory. In Experiment 1, 
participants were presented with a story called The War of the Ghosts through pictures-
only, text-only, or a combination of text and pictures, followed by an immediate recall 
test of the story and a second recall test after a two day delay. In Experiment 2, they were 
asked to also identify whether they detected situation changes in the story as they read or 
viewed the information. Experiment 2 was conducted to examine whether the changes 
(e.g., space, time, entity) in people’s situation models influenced their memories during 
the two day recall task. The findings from these two experiments showed that the type of 
multimedia source people are presented with can affect how well they can form strong 
situation models and retrieve accurate details of the story. In addition, the results showed 
that multimedia can alter the way information is organized when creating a coherent 
mental representation in memory. 
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 I would like to express my gratitude to the following people who have helped me 
in completing this dissertation: 
 To Dr. David Copeland, thank you for your endless guidance and support 
throughout my graduate career. Your training and mentorship have taught me to be more 
open-minded, creative, analytical, independent, and humble. It is because of you that I 
continue to have a strong passion for research. 
 To my committee members, Dr. Mark Ashcraft, Dr. Colleen Parks, and Dr. Tara 
Emmers-Sommer, thank you for your invaluable time and feedback in helping me think 
more critically about my experiments. 
 To Pj Perez, thank you for the wonderful artwork that you have created for The 
War of the Ghosts story. Without your help, my experiments would not have been 
possible to conduct. 
 To my wonderful lab mates in the Reasoning and Memory Lab, thank you for the 
fun and laughter that you have given me throughout the past six years. I would like to 
specifically thank Dr. Jeremy Ashton Houska, Dr. Paul Schroeder, Dr. Nicole Bies-
Hernandez, Kathleen Larson, Michael Palena, and Roseanne Dancel for helping me get 
through the stressful times of this project. 
 Lastly but most importantly, I would like to thank my family. I am truly blessed 
to have them in my life. Their encouragements have helped me to get through the ups and 
downs of completing this dissertation. Thank you! 
v 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my father, 
Willy Gunawan 
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iv 
DEDICATION .................................................................................................................... v 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 
The Cognitive Theory of Multimedia Learning .............................................................. 3 
Cognitive Assumptions of Multimedia Learning ........................................................ 3 
     Dual channels ......................................................................................................... 3 
     Limited working memory capacity ......................................................................... 5 
     Active processing ................................................................................................... 6 
Limitations of the Cognitive Theory of Multimedia Learning ....................................... 7 
Forming Mental Representations .................................................................................... 8 
The Importance of Situation Models ............................................................................. 10 
Situation Models and False Memories .......................................................................... 14 
An Approach for Understanding Situation Models, Memory, and Multimedia ........... 16 
Overview of the Experiments ........................................................................................ 19 
CHAPTER 2: EXPERIMENT 1 ....................................................................................... 21 
Hypotheses .................................................................................................................... 22 
Correct Recall ............................................................................................................ 22 
     Session (Day 1 and 2) ........................................................................................... 22 
     Presentation (Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-Pictures) ................................. 23 
     Session X Presentation ......................................................................................... 23 
Elaborations ............................................................................................................... 24 
     Session (Day 1 and 2) ........................................................................................... 24 
vii 
 
     Presentation (Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-Pictures) ................................. 24 
     Session X Presentation ......................................................................................... 24 
Response Times of the Multimedia Sources ............................................................. 25 
     Encoding (First and Second Time) ....................................................................... 25 
     Presentation (Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-Pictures) ................................. 25 
     Encoding X Presentation ...................................................................................... 26 
The Costs and Benefits of Multimedia on Situation Models and Memories ............. 26 
Method .......................................................................................................................... 27 
Participants ................................................................................................................ 27 
Materials .................................................................................................................... 27 
Design ........................................................................................................................ 30 
Procedure ................................................................................................................... 31 
     Scoring .................................................................................................................. 32 
Results & Discussion .................................................................................................... 33 
Correct Recall ............................................................................................................ 33 
     Session (Day 1 and 2) ........................................................................................... 33 
     Presentation (Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-Pictures) ................................. 34 
     Session X Presentation ......................................................................................... 36 
Elaborations ............................................................................................................... 38 
     Session (Day 1 and 2) ........................................................................................... 38 
     Presentation (Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-Pictures) ................................. 39 
     Session X Presentation ......................................................................................... 40 
Response Times of the Multimedia Sources ............................................................. 41 
     Encoding (First and Second Time) ....................................................................... 41 
viii 
 
     Presentation (Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-Pictures) ................................. 42 
     Session X Presentation ......................................................................................... 43 
The Costs and Benefits of Multimedia on Situation Models and Memories ............. 44 
CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENT 2 ....................................................................................... 46 
Hypotheses .................................................................................................................... 47 
Correct Recall and Elaborations ................................................................................ 47 
Judgments and Response Times ................................................................................ 48 
Response Times of the Multimedia Sources ............................................................. 50 
The Costs and Benefits of Multimedia on Situation Models and Memories ............. 51 
Method .......................................................................................................................... 52 
Participants ................................................................................................................ 52 
Design ........................................................................................................................ 52 
     Space ..................................................................................................................... 53 
     Time ...................................................................................................................... 53 
     Entity (Characters and Objects) ............................................................................ 53 
     Other Variables ..................................................................................................... 54 
Materials and Procedure ............................................................................................ 55 
Results & Discussion .................................................................................................... 56 
Correct Recall ............................................................................................................ 57 
     Session (Day 1 and 2) ........................................................................................... 57 
     Presentation (Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-Pictures) ................................. 57 
     Session X Presentation ......................................................................................... 59 
Elaborations ............................................................................................................... 60 
     Session (Day 1 and 2) ........................................................................................... 60 
ix 
 
     Presentation (Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-Pictures) ................................. 61 
     Session X Presentation ......................................................................................... 62 
Judgments and Response Times ................................................................................ 63 
     Text-Pictures Group ............................................................................................. 63 
     Text-Only Group .................................................................................................. 65 
     Pictures-Only Group ............................................................................................. 67 
Response Times of the Multimedia Sources ............................................................. 68 
     Encoding (First and Second Time) ....................................................................... 68 
     Presentation (Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-Pictures) ................................. 69 
     Encoding X Presentation ...................................................................................... 70 
The Costs and Benefits of Multimedia on Situation Models and Memories ............. 71 
CHAPTER 4: GENERAL DISCUSSION ........................................................................ 73 
A New Perspective on Situation Models and Multimedia ............................................ 73 
The Event Indexing Model ............................................................................................ 77 
Processing Time and Efficiency Scores ........................................................................ 78 
A Contribution to Bartlett’s (1932) The War of the Ghost Story .................................. 80 
Limitations and Future Directions................................................................................. 81 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 83 
Appendix A: The Cognitive Theory of Multimedia Learning .......................................... 85 
Appendix B: An Example of the Presentation Modalities ................................................ 86 
Appendix C: Recall Instructions ....................................................................................... 87 
Appendix D: The Illustrated Narrative ............................................................................. 88 
Appendix E: Standardizing Beta Coefficients for Logistic Regression............................ 97 
Appendix F: Reflection Questions for Experiment 1 ....................................................... 98 
x 
 
Appendix G: Reflection Questions for Experiment 2 ..................................................... 102 
References ....................................................................................................................... 106 
Curriculum Vitae ............................................................................................................ 114 
xi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Judgment and Response Time Beta Weights for the Text-Pictures Group ........ 65 
Table 2. Judgment and Response Time Beta Weights for the Text-Only Group ............. 66 
Table 3. Judgment and Response Time Beta Weights for the Pictures-Only Group ........ 68 
 
xii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. People recalled more correct idea units in Day 1 than in Day 2. Error bars 
represent standard errors. .................................................................................................. 34 
Figure 2. The text-pictures group recalled more correct idea units than the text-only and 
pictures-only groups; the text-only group recalled more correct idea units than the 
pictures-only group. Error bars represent standard errors. ............................................... 36 
Figure 3. Normal forgetting in the number of correct idea units occurred for the text-
pictures and text-only groups but not for the pictures-only group between Day 1 and Day 
2. Error bars represent standard errors. ............................................................................. 38 
Figure 4. People elaborated similarly for Day 1 and Day 2. Error bars represent standard 
errors. ................................................................................................................................ 39 
Figure 5. The pictures-only group recalled more false idea units than the text-pictures and 
text-only groups. Error bars represent standard errors. ..................................................... 40 
Figure 6. The text-pictures group recalled more false idea units from Day 1 to Day 2, 
whereas no increase in elaborations was observed in Day 1 and 2 for the text-only and 
pictures-only groups. Error bars represent standard errors. .............................................. 41 
Figure 7. People took longer to process the story the first time than the second time. Error 
bars represent standard errors. .......................................................................................... 42 
Figure 8. The text-pictures and pictures-only groups processed the story longer than the 
text-only group. Error bars represent standard errors. ...................................................... 43 
Figure 9. The three presentation groups were slower during the first time reading / 
viewing the story than the second time. Error bars represent standard errors. ................. 44 
Figure 10. The text-pictures and text-only groups had higher efficiency scores than the 
pictures-only group. Error bars represent standard errors. ............................................... 45 
Figure 11. People recalled more correct idea units in Day 1 than in Day 2. Error bars 
represent standard errors. .................................................................................................. 57 
Figure 12. The text-pictures group recalled more correct idea units than the text-only and 
pictures-only groups; the text-only group recalled more correct idea units than the 
pictures-only group. Error bars represent standard errors. ............................................... 59 
xiii 
 
Figure 13. The text-pictures and text-only groups recalled fewer correct idea units in Day 
2 than in Day 1 relative to the pictures-only group, showing normal forgetting. Error bars 
represent standard errors. .................................................................................................. 60 
Figure 14. People recalled more false idea units in Day 2 than in Day 1. Error bars 
represent standard errors. .................................................................................................. 61 
Figure 15. The pictures-only group recalled more false idea units than the text-pictures 
and text-only groups. Error bars represent standard errors. .............................................. 62 
Figure 16. The text-pictures and text-only groups recalled more false idea units from Day 
1 to Day 2 than the pictures-only group. Error bars represent standard errors. ................ 63 
Figure 17. People took longer processing the story during the first time than the second 
time. Error bars represent standard errors. ........................................................................ 69 
Figure 18. The text-pictures group processed the story longer than the text-only and 
pictures-only groups, followed by the text-only group processing the story longer than the 
pictures-only group. Error bars represent standard errors. ............................................... 70 
Figure 19. All of the presentation groups read / viewed the story longer during the first 
time than the second time. Error bars represent standard errors. ...................................... 71 
Figure 20. The text-pictures group had the highest mean efficiency score than the text-
only and pictures-only group; the text-only group had a higher mean efficiency score than 
the pictures-only group. Error bars represent standard errors. .......................................... 72 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 People construct mental representations called situation models to comprehend 
and connect various events (e.g., locations, time, and entity) of a story in memory (Zwaan 
& Radvansky, 1998). With society’s increasing use of multimedia, in which presentations 
are given in a variety of visual and verbal structure, the ability to form situation models 
may be influenced by how the information is given. Most studies examining situation 
models for narratives have relied on traditional text-based reading and rarely on other 
interactive formats (e.g., illustrated narratives). Only recently, cognitive researchers have 
begun to study situation models using video games (Magliano, Radvansky, & Copeland, 
2007), virtual environments (Radvansky & Copeland, 2006a), films (Magliano, Miller, & 
Zwaan, 2001; Zacks, Speer, & Reynolds, 2009), and children’s storybooks (Magliano, 
Kopp, McNerney, Radvansky, & Zacks, 2012). However, even with these multimedia 
sources, further research is needed to understand what is actually formed in people’s 
situation models (i.e., the details they imagine and retrieve in memory). Previous studies 
have mainly focused on how these mental representations affect online processing 
through judgment tasks and response times only. 
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine how people’s mental 
representations through text only, pictures only, or the combination of text and pictures 
affect what is stored and remembered in memory. Specifically, this dissertation explored 
the possible strengths and challenges of creating and managing situation models by 
giving people a recall task. This investigation of situation models in memory was not 
only based on accuracy but also on the errors that people committed when creating these 
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mental representations. Due to the reconstructive nature of memory (Bartlett, 1932), in 
which recollection can be skewed by false representations, the use of multimedia can 
either promote greater accuracy during recall or exacerbate people’s memory 
performance. By examining situation models for multimedia, the findings helped to 
provide a deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms associated with the 
formation and organization of mental representations in memory. 
 Multimedia has been a study of interest in education, communications, and 
cognitive science. Mayer (2005; 2011) proposed a comprehensive model known as the 
cognitive theory of multimedia learning to assess how encoding text and pictures allow 
mental representations to be created for later retrieval. However, the question of how 
these mental representations operate in multimedia remains ambiguous. Explanations of 
how pictorial and textual representations function on their own or integrate into a 
coherent representation are limited because this theory only provides a broad assumption 
that people benefit in learning by constructing mental representations with pictures and 
text. In this dissertation, a comic book format was used to narrate a story known as The 
War of the Ghosts (Bartlett, 1932) to explore a new theory of situation models and 
memory in multimedia. Specifically, the following questions were addressed. As people 
access information through pictures and text, how do they form separate mental 
representations for each of these modalities so that memories are stored? Is there an 
organizational structure for forming mental representations for pictures and text that 
enables memories to be maintained? Also, how do processing pictures and text impact the 
accuracy of what is retained from people’s mental representation (particularly when using 
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a narrative that is known to produce altered / reconstructed memories)? Finally, to what 
extent do people integrate the information from these two sources? 
The Cognitive Theory of Multimedia Learning 
 Mayer (2005; 2011) refers to the understanding of how people learn through 
words and pictures in various forms of presentation as the cognitive theory of multimedia 
learning (see Appendix A). This theory incorporates the modal model (Atkinson & 
Shiffrin, 1968) which consists of three memory systems: sensory memory, working 
memory, and long-term memory. Sensory memory involves attending to and holding 
briefly the multimedia presentation (i.e., the words or pictures) through the eyes and ears. 
The information is then sent to working memory where it is the central work of 
multimedia learning. The words and pictures are filtered and managed in working 
memory so that certain pictorial and textual information is used to construct the mental 
representations necessary to understand what has been processed. Long-term memory 
plays the role of maintaining prior knowledge (e.g., one’s schema) to assist with the 
mental representations produced in working memory. From these three memory stores, 
the process of multimedia learning is guided by three cognitive assumptions: (1) dual 
channels, (2) working memory capacity limitations, and (3) active processes of 
constructing mental representations for pictures and text. 
Cognitive Assumptions of Multimedia Learning 
Dual channels. Multimedia learning involves the selective encoding of 
information through presentation modes and sensory modalities (Mayer, 2005). These 
two information-processing sources activate their own separate dual channels. The 
presentation modes focus on the materials that are presented using pictures and words. 
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According to Paivio’s (1969) dual coding hypothesis, people maintain memory codes for 
pictorial and textual representations during learning. If words provide high visual 
imagery and concrete associations with images (e.g., the word ‘book’), people are able to 
strengthen their retention for those words. However, if words are represented in an 
abstract way and generate no strong associations to a particular image (e.g., the word 
‘freedom’), those words are capable of being retained but may be challenging to store for 
later retrieval. In contrast, images alone do not exhibit a similar problem like abstract 
words because they can stand as an independent pictorial code that can also trigger a 
verbal code in memory (Paivio, 1975; Reed, 2006). Thus, memories for pictures tend to 
be stronger than words, often generating a picture superiority effect (see also Paivio & 
Csapo, 1973). The effect enhances people’s memories by offering distinctive images that 
are easily conveyed as meaningful and additive to words. Although the picture 
superiority effect has been well-supported in many studies, there are some cases in which 
the verbal code can alter memories for images. For instance, people who are unable to 
describe an ambiguous picture (e.g., an unknown shape) may use a label or description to 
remember the information better instead of relying on the picture itself (Brandimonte, 
Hitch, & Bishop, 1992; Carmichael, Hogan, & Walter, 1932; Schooler & Engstler-
Schooler, 1990). 
 The other information-processing source that incorporates a dual channel 
assumption involves the sensory input. Multimedia learning can be perceived through 
either seeing or hearing. These two sensory modalities are important because they 
emphasize what information to take in for mental representations to be constructed from 
the sensory memory to working memory. Although the use of auditory and visual 
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information can enhance learning, both modalities can function separately during the 
encoding process. For the purpose of this dissertation, the main focus will be on the 
visual channel, in which text and images are processed and stored for comprehension and 
retention. 
Limited working memory capacity. Mayer (2005) uses several theories to 
address the fact that information taken in as pictures and text from sensory memory can 
be held at a limited capacity in working memory. Specifically, he borrows his limited 
capacity assumption from Baddeley’s working memory model (Baddeley, 2001; 
Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) and Sweller’s (1998) cognitive load theory. In Baddeley’s 
model, text and pictures are channeled in through different components, such as the 
phonological loop and visual sketchpad, so that information can be stored temporarily to 
connect and hold other new items in working memory. For instance, text can be held in 
working memory as sound in the phonological loop or sight in the visual sketchpad. 
Pictures, on the other hand, can only be held in working memory as images; therefore, it 
can only be stored in the visual sketchpad. When an overwhelming amount of text and 
pictures are processed in working memory, certain information can be lost or held poorly 
for later retrieval. Thus, the inability to process all of the information may disrupt the 
possibility of creating a complete and coherent mental representation for text and 
pictures.  
In another perspective of how working memory consists of a limited capacity, 
Sweller (1994) proposed that people can overload their mental resources due to an 
intrinsic load, germane load, or extraneous load. The intrinsic load examines the 
difficulty and complexity of understanding the content. When the intrinsic load is high, 
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people have a challenging time learning the information. For instance, processing spatial 
locations of objects through text descriptions may be much more difficult to retain than 
processing them using pictures (Copeland & Radvansky, 2007). The germane load is 
focused on the efforts required to process and create new schemas to enhance learning. 
This type of load is often associated with motivation and interests. When people are 
given some form of practice to apply their prior knowledge to other examples of a 
problem, this strategy can increase their germane load, reducing the mental resources 
needed in their limited working memory capacity (Paas & van Gog, 2006). The 
extraneous load involves the demands of retaining the to-be-presented information. That 
is, irrelevant information can occupy one’s mental resources, reducing the learning 
process and the ability to build important mental representations. An example would be 
to distract people with unnecessary text onscreen during a narrated animation, causing 
them to attend to other information other than what is important through the animation 
itself (Mayer & Moreno, 2003). 
Active processing. The last assumption of the cognitive theory of multimedia 
learning is that people are active processors when building a coherent mental 
representation from pictures and text. Mayer (2005) posited three essential processes for 
information to be retained and understood. They are selection, organization, and 
integration. These processes do not necessarily follow a linear fashion as all three 
processes can happen simultaneously. Selection begins when words and pictures are 
presented through the sensory memory via the ears and eyes. During this selection phase, 
the information is distinguished as either sounds or images in working memory. As these 
sensory inputs provide information to working memory, organization is engaged. The 
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words and pictures are organized as separate mental representations through a verbal 
model and pictorial model. For people to make sense of the materials that they are given, 
the verbal and pictorial models must integrate or make connections with the information 
for coherence. People’s schema, or prior knowledge, from long term memory is also 
integrated during this process. 
Limitations of the Cognitive Theory of Multimedia Learning 
 There are several limitations to the cognitive theory of multimedia learning. First, 
although multimedia can be applied to various materials, most studies conducted by 
Mayer and his colleagues are typically associated with learning a scientific process (e.g., 
how batteries or the brake systems work) and do not examine learning in other instances 
like reading stories. Thus, their findings are informative for materials using instructional 
(e.g., procedural or fact-based knowledge) but not necessarily descriptive (e.g., stories) 
designs. Differences in the type of information given may alter how mental 
representations are created. For instance, people who perceived text narratives as literary 
were likely to slow down in reading times and show disruptions in their situation models 
than those who perceived text narratives as a newspaper (Zwaan, 1991; 1994). Second, 
the multimedia learning theory focuses greatly on practical issues, such as how pictures 
and text should be organized for an effective presentation (see examples of various 
multimedia principles from a book chapter written by Mayer, 2011). Although these 
practical issues are important, this dissertation focused more on the theoretical aspect of 
constructing pictorial and textual mental representations for multimedia learning. Lastly, 
the process by which the representations of pictures and text are organized or integrated 
with prior knowledge is not clearly specified in the theory. This last limitation needs 
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further clarification as suggested from some researchers, such as Reed (2006), and is 
discussed further in a later section of this dissertation. 
Forming Mental Representations 
 In studies that have examined comprehension for text narratives, researchers 
suggest that there are three levels of mental representations that are distinct yet not 
mutually exclusive during online reading: the (1) surface structure, (2) propositional 
textbase, and (3) situation model (Kintsch, 1994; van Djik & Kintsch, 1983). The most 
basic level of the three mental representations is known as the surface structure. At this 
level, people focus primarily on the words themselves, processing the sentences in a 
verbatim-like manner. A surface structure representation is thought to be temporary, and 
although some are capable of retaining the exact wording in long-term memory (e.g., see 
Murphy & Shapiro, 1994 on jokes and Rubin, 1995 on songs and poems), most people 
will often reconstruct the content based on the gist, or the main idea of the story (e.g., 
Bartlett, 1932). This type of reconstruction leads to the next level of mental 
representation called the propositional textbase, in which meaning is represented based 
on propositions, or idea units. In contrast to the surface structure, the propositional 
textbase operates conceptually, focusing on the semantic meaning explicitly mentioned in 
the text without relying on the sentences word-for-word. For example, Bransford and 
Franks (1971; 1972) presented participants with a list of propositions like the following: 
 The ants were in the kitchen. 
 The ants ate the jelly. 
 The jelly was sweet. 
 The jelly was on the table. 
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The propositional textbase representation would be based on each of those statements, 
but it would not necessarily be based on the exact words (like the surface structure). For 
example, people may remember that, “Inside of the kitchen, there were some ants.” They 
may also remember that there was “sweet jelly”. The last and highest level of mental 
representation is known as a situation model (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 
1998). At this level, people process sentences beyond the propositional structure by 
inferring from the described state of affairs and elaborating on the facts given. 
Specifically, people can take on an active role in the story by placing themselves in the 
perspective of the characters and their surroundings (e.g., the time frame that the story 
takes place, the location of which the events are happening, or the objects that the 
characters are carrying). With the above example about the ants in the kitchen, people 
might integrate all of those ideas into a common representation and may possibly expand 
on it by drawing inferences, such as inferring that the ants climbed up the table legs to 
reach the jelly. 
 The construction of situation models involves three separate components that 
influence each other as a way to connect the story together in memory. The components 
are referred to as (1) the current model, (2) the integrated model, and (3) the complete 
model (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). The current model is activated as readers attend to 
the specific sentences given at hand. As new knowledge is retrieved from the current 
model, the integrated model plays an important role in maintaining coherence. The 
integrated model acts as a global model so that recent and previously relevant 
information are linked together in working memory. Specifically, there are two functions 
that occur in the process known as updating and foregrounding. When people encounter 
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new information in a narrative, updating allows them to incorporate the information 
accessed from the current model with prior knowledge stored from the integrated model. 
Updating is necessary because people are able to outline the direction and progression of 
the story (Sanford & Garrod, 1990). Foregrounding is associated with updating by 
providing retrieval cues for the connection between the current and integrated models. 
The purpose of foregrounding is to keep important facts and ideas in mind so that readers 
can assess and fill in the events that are being focused or resolved with relevant pre-
existing information. Once an entire story has ended, a complete model is produced and 
stored in long-term memory. Although a model may seem “complete,” people cannot 
assume that the model is final. Readers may later reflect on a story and reconstruct or 
develop a new model for that story, reactivating the current and integrated models. 
The Importance of Situation Models 
 The formation of situation models, or mental representations of the described state 
of affairs, is an important process for understanding narratives because situation models 
allow people to connect different aspects (e.g., time, location, characters, and objects) of 
a story that could affect how information is retrieved during recall. Unlike the surface 
structure or propositional textbase, in which these mental representations rely solely on 
the information given in the sentences, situation models require people’s imagination and 
their interpretation of the information conveyed. However, people’s interpretation of their 
situation model may often be influenced by their schema. To differentiate these two 
concepts, a situation model is based on the specific descriptions or experiences made 
within a story, whereas a schema is based on prior experience or general knowledge that 
is perceived as stereotypical (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). For instance, in the story being 
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used for this dissertation called The War of the Ghosts, two young men from Egulac are 
hunting seals in a river. In a situation model based on the text, people would imagine 
these two young men going out to a river to hunt for seals, as it is described in the 
sentence. However, it is possible that the situation model can be influenced by a reliance 
on a schema based on the readers’ past experiences or memories. For example, some 
people may imagine two males going to a body of water to go fishing. In this case, the 
two young men can be identified as boys or young adults, the body of water can be 
recognized as a lake or river, and the fishing can be considered as hunting for seals or any 
type of fish. According to van Dijk and Kintsch (1983), a schema can be used as a 
building block to guide or create a situation model. Thus, situation models allow people 
to make inferences based on actual information given in the narrative and general ideas 
from memory, such as schemas. 
 Studies examining situation models have been shown to affect people’s cognitive 
processing. In text narratives, research has shown that readers slow down in reading 
times when they view changes to a story (e.g., Zwaan, Magliano, & Graesser, 1995). The 
increase of reading times occurs because people are updating, or making the connection 
of new information in working memory (i.e., the current model) with prior knowledge 
from long term memory (i.e., the integrated model), to create a well-formed situation 
model. Zwaan, Langston, and Graesser (1995) suggested that these changes are 
monitored based on different aspects of the story, referred to as the Event Indexing 
model. Some of these aspects or event dimensions in the story are time, space, entity, 
causality, and goals. For example, in a study by Therriault, Rinck, and Zwaan (2006), 
they had participants focus either on time, space, or characters while reading through 
12 
 
each sentence of a story. The researchers found that although the participants were asked 
to monitor only one particular event dimension, the reading times slowed down for 
changes occurring in the sentences for the other dimensions as well. This finding suggests 
that forming situation models involves updating changes of various aspects of a story 
simultaneously to organize the information in memory and to provide coherence. 
 The understanding of how situation models are constructed through pictures or 
the combination of pictures with text in narratives is limited thus far. One study 
conducted by Magliano, Kopp, McNerney, Radvansky, and Zacks (2012) found that 
older and younger adults were capable of forming situation models of children’s 
storybooks through a judgment task. In their study, they had participants identify whether 
a situation had changed when given the storybooks through text only or pictures only 
without giving them any instructions as to the definition of the changes. The goal of the 
experimenters was to examine whether participants were able to identify changes for 
space, time, characters, emotions, and goals while reading or viewing the story. The 
results indicated that the older and younger adults’ judgments were consistent with shifts 
in all of the event dimensions (except for emotions in the older adult group) during their 
comprehension of the story. This finding implies that situation models are mostly 
preserved for pictures and text as people age. 
 The effects of using text and pictures to construct situation models have also been 
observed in recognition memory. Radvansky and Copeland (2006b) demonstrated that 
separate mental representations for text and pictures can cause differences leading to a 
fan effect, which is the interference that occurs when retrieving information that cannot 
be integrated into a single representation. They found that the fan effect occurred more 
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for text than pictures because separate mental representations are activated. Specifically, 
whereas the use of text will require more of a situation model-based process, pictures can 
be viewed as a surface form or perceptually-based process. In this case, the surface form 
of pictures is characterized by unique details of the objects and locations that cannot be 
mentally represented in different ways by a person like when one is reading text. As a 
result, recognition was faster for pictures than text. Similarly, Copeland and Radvansky 
(2007) reported that how people retrieve mental representations for spatial directions of 
objects for pictures relative to text can increase accuracy and improve response times, 
especially for older adults. Unlike the use of text, in which effort is needed to form a 
situation model to integrate spatial information, the use of images can activate a picture 
superiority effect, in which the retrieval is enhanced by perceiving distinct and 
meaningful images. Thus, images may possibly facilitate the process of creating a visual 
mental representation without people having to create it themselves.  
 Unlike most studies, in which situation models are assessed through processing 
time, judgments, or recognition, the purpose of this dissertation was to explore the  
mental representations that are created from an illustrated narrative by using a recall 
procedure. To examine how situation models are influenced by pictures and text, people 
were instructed to recall what they read and / or viewed in a comic book style narrative. 
The comic book format was used because the text and pictures were uniquely integrated 
in a story and were not presented separately, such as in a children’s storybook where the 
sentences are typically shown independently from the pictures. In comic books, readers 
must rely on the dialogues and narrative text boxes to put context to the illustrations 
given (McCloud, 1993). Additionally, only a few studies have incorporated comic books 
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as a way to understand situation models. For instance, Cohn, Paczynski, Jackendoff, 
Holcomb, and Kuperberg, (2012) used short image-only comic strips to examine how 
people rely on the structure (e.g., the order of the panels and the meaningfulness of the 
images) of a visual narrative to produce coherence. However, like other studies, their 
work often used processing time and a recognition task (see Cohn, 2012 for details about 
the structure). A theoretical approach for how situation models affect memory through 
multimedia like comic books is addressed later. 
Situation Models and False Memories 
 Although research examining situation models are not often associated with false 
memories, people can still be susceptible to having false mental representations. For 
instance, people may rely on their schema, or prior knowledge that conveys stereotypical 
information, to construct their situation models. As a consequence, they may omit 
original details and elaborate on non-existent facts during recall. Bartlett (1932) noted 
that distortions can be caused by rationalization, or people’s interpretation of what they 
perceive is true for an event. Three active processes are involved in making these 
rationalizations. First, the importation or transfer of outside sources from memory, such 
as creating symbolisms for events that are not clearly understood, can be used to justify 
what is going on in a narrative to provide meaning (e.g., the assumption that “something 
black came out of his mouth” can symbolize a man’s soul or dying breath in the War of 
the Ghost story). Second, unclear details of a narrative can cause people to transform 
abstract concepts into concrete ones (e.g., the assumption that “something black came out 
of his mouth” was just something foaming at the mouth). Lastly, people’s biases and 
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interests may influence how people rationalize information to create connections of 
various events so that they are able to make sense of the story. 
Text narratives can often be used to express ideas or beliefs that can alter people’s 
mental representation. For instance, Loftus and Pickrell (1995) had people read through 
events that occurred in their childhood life but also included a false event about them 
being lost in the mall. Interestingly, about 25% of the participants were likely to falsely 
believe and recall that they had gone through the lost-in-the-mall experience as a child. In 
addition, the way text is conveyed to retrieve information can also have a detrimental 
effect on people’s situation models. For example, Loftus and Palmer (1974) distorted 
people’s responses of a car accident by incorporating various verbs in their interrogation. 
Specifically, the students saw a film of a car accident and were later asked questions 
about the speed of the vehicles and whether they saw broken glass in the accident. When 
the researchers replaced the word “hit” with other verbs, such as “smashed,” “collided,” 
“bumped,” or “contacted,” many students were likely to alter their estimation of the 
speed of the vehicles. Some even concluded that there was broken glass (when in reality, 
there was none) for the stronger verbs. Thus, the text used to produce memories can often 
influence the mental representations that people have based on minor changes to 
descriptions of an original event. 
 Information given in a pictorial form can also influence the possibility of people 
creating false mental representations. In a study by Wade, Garry, Read, and Lindsay 
(2002), the researchers interviewed participants several times about their childhood life 
using a set of real pictures, but with one fake picture of them being on a hot air balloon. 
They found that 50% of the people were likely to report the fake picture to be true. This 
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result may be due to the eventual familiarity of the image and the belief of pictures being 
a credible source. False mental representations can also be generated using real pictures. 
Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, and Garry (2004) showed participants a real photograph of 
their grade school class and gave them a fake story about a prank they pulled by putting 
Slime, a children’s toy that consist of a green goopy substance, in their teacher’s desk 
drawer. The findings demonstrated that with suggestibility and greater confidence, false 
memories can still be produced even when the pictures themselves are genuine. Also, 
people may likely blend in the actual picture to their own imagination of the event. 
Research has also shown that although the combination of text and pictures can 
enhance memory (David, 1998), these two modalities can still elicit false memories. For 
instance, Garry, Strange, Berstein, and Kinzett (2007) asked students to pretend that they 
were newspaper editors reviewing three articles. In the study, they were given a picture 
for each article before or after they read the stories. When students read the stories and 
were given a picture afterwards, they were likely to generate false representations of the 
stories in a surprise memory test. For example, in one of the stories they reviewed, there 
was a hurricane that struck a community and caused property damages. However, some 
students reported that there were also statements about personal injuries occurring even 
when there was no evidence of this information in the text or picture. This finding 
suggests that people can often use pictures as a strong resource for speculating a fact that 
does not exist. 
An Approach for Understanding Situation Models, Memory, and Multimedia 
 Relative to past studies of text narratives, situation models may operate differently 
when giving people pictures and text for narratives. According to Mayer’s (2011) 
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cognitive theory of multimedia learning, the two multimedia presentations can function 
as independent mental representations (i.e., causing people to remember through text only 
or pictures only) or work together to develop a complete understanding of the 
information given. However, how does multimedia influence what is being mentally 
represented and remembered? To investigate the processes involved, separate theories for 
situation models are addressed for narratives that are presented as text only, pictures only, 
or the combination of text and pictures. Specifically, the focus is on whether text and 
pictures enhance or degrade the formation of situation models, which can possibly 
influence people’s memory performance. 
 In text narratives, people rely on situation models to construct their own mental 
images of the descriptions made from the story. Information can be organized by 
focusing on changes that occur for space, time, characters, and objects so that events are 
linked together and updated in long term memory. Memory accuracy may depend on 
people’s attention to specific details of their situation models. Information that stays true 
to their situation models in a narrative should increase accuracy. However, these mental 
representations can be altered by outside factors, such as forgetting and schematic 
processing, which can disrupt the coherence of a narrative. Past research has shown that 
people do not retain memory for the text itself very long, so if details are lost, people may 
rely more on inferences or reconstructive processes to get the gist or main idea of the 
story as retrieval cues. As a result, some information may be omitted and details might be 
elaborated to fit the overall idea of the story in memory. 
 In contrast, situation models may take on a more passive role for pictorial 
narratives because the mental representations are already created by the images given. 
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Although people are capable of organizing images for space, time, characters, and objects 
to connect details of a story, they may rely more on their interpretation of the images and 
not from actual details that would be given in a text format. Memories for pictures are 
generated perceptually, causing people to rely on the surface form (i.e., the images that 
they see) and the propositional textbase (i.e., the general idea of what the images convey) 
to form their mental representations. Yet, pictures may not necessarily reduce the quality 
of what they remember in a narrative. With the picture superiority effect, people can 
imagine and generate stronger images for a story because they have direct knowledge of 
what is perceived in the story. It should be noted, though, that this picture superiority 
effect can still be prone to errors during recall because people may construct a different 
situation model depicted from what they see and their schema (Schnotz & Bannert, 
2003). 
 The integration of pictures and text may create a different dynamic for situation 
models in memory. Not only can people generate mental images from reading the text, 
they can also use pictures to assist them with retrieval cues about the events in the 
narrative. Four possibilities can occur with integrating pictures and text. First, people can 
use these two presentation modalities together to fill in gaps of missing information 
between their mental representation and their perceptual representation in memory. 
Therefore, there may be an additive effect of organizing various events, such as space, 
time, and entities, through constructing situation models and processing details 
perceptually. As a possible consequence, false memories may be reduced because of a 
support system that establishes what is known about the story. Another possibility would 
be that people may fail to produce memory accuracy through situation models because 
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they may rely greatly on the pictures and not on what was mentally represented during 
reading. With the picture superiority effect, the images may generate ideas that may not 
be associated to the actual narrative. People may use their own interpretations of the 
pictures they remember to connect the events of the story together rather than relying on 
the text to also guide them with their mental representations. Thus, they may speculate 
from the pictures given because of not processing accurate details derived from the text. 
The third possibility of integrating text and pictures is the greater reliance on textual 
information that is mentally misrepresented due to schemas or rationalization. The 
pictures may then be used as an additional form of speculation to confirm what they 
mentally misrepresented through the text. A final possibility would be that memory 
accuracy is reduced due to the lack of attention given to both text and pictures. As a 
result, a complete situation model is unable to be formed because both multimedia 
sources are not fully encoded when they are presented with the illustrated narrative. This 
last possibility is less likely to occur because the participants are given the chance to read 
and view the story twice (a procedure used by Bartlett [1932] when studying memory 
with The War of the Ghosts). By doing so, this procedure allows them to update their 
mental representations with pertinent information that might have been neglected during 
prior reading or viewing. 
Overview of the Experiments 
Two experiments were conducted in this dissertation. In Experiment 1, 
participants were presented with a Native American Indian folktale known as The War of 
the Ghosts through text only, pictures only, or a combination of text and pictures to 
assess how situation models influence memory in a recall task. The focus was to evaluate 
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whether people’s situation models cause them to maintain accurate information or 
produce errors (elaborations) with the multimedia method that they were given. In 
Experiment 2, the same procedure was used except that participants were asked to also 
identify whether there were changes in the story as they go through each panel one at a 
time. Their responses of whether the changes occurred within the story were recorded to 
examine if identifying certain changes alter how mental representations are constructed 
for pictures and text or if they notice changes differently. Additionally, their responses 
for where changes occur in the story were used to examine accurate and false memories. 
Experiment 2 expanded on the understanding of situation models in multimedia by using 
the Event Indexing model (Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 1995; Zwaan, Magliano, & 
Graesser, 1995) which focuses on changes occurring for time, space, characters, and 
objects, when reading or viewing an illustrated narrative. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 The purpose of Experiment 1 was to assess how well situation models are 
constructed and retrieved in memory over a two day period. Participants were assigned 
randomly to a text-only, pictures-only, or text-pictures group, in which they were 
presented with a story known as The War of the Ghosts. After reading and / or viewing 
the illustrated narrative, they were given two separate recall tests, once on the first day, 
shortly after reading, and a second one 48 hours later. In examining the participants’ 
memory performance over time, two possibilities were predicted to occur during the two 
recall tests. The first possibility was that memory for details would decline from the 
immediate test to the delayed test. Ebbinghaus’s (1885 / 1913) forgetting curve showed a 
significant decline in memory, when testing immediately versus after 48 hours. In 
Ebbinghaus’s self-study of his memory for nonsense syllables, he was only able to recall 
27.8 percent of the original items after two days.  
Researchers have argued that this drastic decline in retention after 48 hours may 
be due to how meaningful the information was during encoding; Ebbinghaus’s memory 
may have decreased because he was studying meaningless consonant-vowel-consonant 
items. This argument leads to the second possibility of an increase in the participants’ 
memory performance over time. Erdelyi and Becker (1974) demonstrated a memory 
improvement, known as hypermnesia, when repeatedly testing people with a list of words 
and pictures. Although they did not show too much change in recall for words, they 
found an increase in recall for pictures. This result may be due to a picture superiority 
effect; however, other researchers (e.g., Mulligan, 2005; Payne & Roediger, 1987) have 
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observed hypermnesia for words, suggesting that deeper levels of processing and retrieval 
effort can influence memory improvements. Hypermnesia may also occur due to a more 
careful and thorough search for new items in memory when people have exhausted their 
search and retrieval of all old items (Gunawan & Gerkens, 2011). In another study related 
to hypermnesia, Erdelyi (1998) conducted an experiment with nine participants using The 
War of Ghosts in a text narrative format. He showed that participants recalled fewer 
details after a ten week gap but showed memory improvements when they were given 
more repeated recall tests after those ten weeks. The limitations to his study were that he 
only observed the hypermnesia effect based on the number of correct words (not facts or 
ideas) and interpreted the results to justify Freudian concepts. 
In the current experiment, the recall test findings were assessed through the 
recollection of idea units or propositions, examining correct recall (i.e., information that 
was accurate) and elaborations (i.e., information that was false or misremembered). In 
addition, a general assessment of how long people processed information through 
response times from the text-only, pictures-only, and text-pictures versions were 
conducted. A costs and benefits analysis was also performed to assess how the length of 
time processing the story can affect people’s correct recall and elaborations. The results 
were used to determine whether the use of text and / or pictures as multimedia sources 
affect people’s situation models and memory. 
Hypotheses 
Correct Recall 
Session (Day 1 and 2). When examining correct recall based on the two sessions, 
participants were predicted to recall more idea units in Day 1 than in Day 2 for all three 
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narrative conditions. This prediction came from Ebbinghaus’s (1885 / 1913) theory of 
normal forgetting and the finding of Erdelyi’s (1998) study using a text version of The 
War of the Ghosts, in which there was a drastic decline in recall after the first testing in 
ten weeks. However, there may also be the possibility of hypermnesia, or a memory 
improvement, in Day 2 for the text-pictures group. Specifically, the text-pictures group 
may be able to generate a picture-superiority effect and a stronger situation model due to 
greater retrieval cues from the text and pictures. 
Presentation (Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-Pictures). The text-pictures 
group would recall more correct idea units than the text-only and pictures-only groups 
because the combination of text and pictures may provide a stronger cue to form a 
complete situation model during recall. This presentation method can also be thought of 
as “ready-made” dual coding because the information is presented in both formats. In 
addition, it was predicted that the text-only group would recall more correct idea units 
than the pictures-only group because they would be able to interpret the story according 
to what was originally written on the text, creating an accurate situation model than the 
pictures-only group. That is, the pictures-only group may not be as accurate when 
recalling the text verbally because they may be relying on their interpretation of the main 
ideas in each picture. 
Session X Presentation. Two possibilities were given for the interaction between 
session and presentation. For the first possibility, participants in the text-pictures and 
text-only groups would recall more idea units than the pictures-only group during Day 1, 
whereas participants in the text-pictures group would only recall more idea units than the 
text-only and pictures-only groups during Day 2 due to the strength of the mental 
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representations created when text and pictures were combined. Another possibility would 
be that participants in the text-pictures and the text-only groups would recall more idea 
units than the pictures-only group during Day 1, but all of the groups would recall fewer 
idea units during Day 2 because mental representations are not resistant to forgetting and 
/or the reconstruction of memory. 
Elaborations 
Session (Day 1 and 2). Due to the reconstructive nature of human memory, 
people would make more elaborations (false idea units) in Day 2 than in Day 1, 
supporting the findings by Bartlett (1932) and Bergman and Roediger (1999). Several 
factors may contribute to these elaborations, such as rationalization, schematic 
processing, normal forgetting, and speculations / inferences made from one’s point of 
view of the story. 
Presentation (Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-Pictures). The text-pictures 
group should recall fewer false idea units than the text-only and pictures-only groups 
because of the combination of pictorial and textual cues given to mentally represent the 
story. However, the text-only and pictures-only groups should recall a similar number of 
false idea units because they would rely on their schemas more to mentally represent 
uncertain details. The text-only group would use more of their own imagination to create 
a different mental image of the story to connect the events together, whereas the pictures-
only group would use more of their own interpretation to make sense of the story without 
any text given to them. 
Session X Presentation. It was thought that an interaction would occur between 
session and presentation. For Day 1, participants in both the text-pictures and text-only 
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groups would recall fewer false idea units than the pictures-only group because of their 
ability to encode information that is relevant to the text. The pictures-only group would 
rely more on their schemas and their interpretation of the story because they only have 
pictures to understand the narrative. However, for Day 2, the text-pictures group would 
only show fewer false idea units relative to the text-only and pictures-only groups 
because the text-pictures group would have the advantage of using both the text and 
pictures for retrieval cues. The text-only and pictures-only groups were left with one type 
of mental representation to guide them through their memory of the story. 
Response Times of the Multimedia Sources 
 The ability to form situation models may be associated with how much time 
people process information from the multimedia sources. Response times were measured 
based on the number of minutes people read or viewed the story. 
Encoding (First and Second Time). People were predicted to be slower for the 
first time they read / viewed the narrative than the second time because more effort would 
be required to form a complete situation model for the story when they are first 
introduced to it. The decrease in response times for the second time would be due to 
people having an established representation of the story after reading it once (Zwaan et 
al., 1995). 
Presentation (Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-Pictures). Response times 
would be slower for the text-pictures group than the text-only and pictures-only groups 
because in addition to having to form a situation model for the story, they must integrate 
both text and pictures to build a consistent understanding of the storyline. The text-only 
group would process the story longer than the pictures-only group because they must use 
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their own effort to create mental images of the story. The pictures-only group only needs 
to use their perceptual representation to process the information, allowing them to 
process the information more quickly (Copeland & Radvansky, 2007; Radvansky & 
Copeland, 2006b). 
Encoding X Presentation. There would be no significant interaction between 
encoding and presentation because the text-pictures, text-only, and pictures-only groups 
would show a similar pattern when reading / viewing the story the first time to the second 
time. Specifically, response times would be slower for the first time and faster for the 
second time. Across the three presentation groups, however, the presentation group 
would encode the story longer than text-only and pictures-only groups and the text-only 
groups would process the story longer than the pictures-only group. 
The Costs and Benefits of Multimedia on Situation Models and Memories 
 A costs and benefits analysis was conducted to determine whether the length of 
time going through the text-only, pictures-only, or text-pictures version of the story 
influenced the accuracy and elaborations produced in people’s situation models and 
memories. The following formula was used to create an efficiency score for each 
participant: 
 
The mean efficiency scores were compared among the three presentation groups. Scores 
that ranged higher would represent situation models and memories that were more 
accurate based on the amount of time people took to process the material. Scores that 
ranged lower or in the negative numbers would represent situation models and memories 
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that were driven by elaborations (i.e., more false idea units) based on the amount of time 
that people processed the story. From the three groups, the text-pictures group should 
have a higher mean efficiency score than the text-only and pictures-only groups because 
the amount of time spent on text and pictures together would provide a stronger retrieval 
cue for constructing a more complete mental representation, strengthening people’s 
memories for the narrative. The text-only group would have the next highest mean 
efficiency score compared to the pictures-only group because they would spend time 
relying on their mental images for the text without being guided by any visual cues to 
remember the information. The pictures-only group would have the lowest mean 
efficiency score because, while people may passively and rapidly view the pictures to 
interpret the story without any information from the text, this would likely increase the 
likelihood of elaborations. 
Method 
Participants 
There were a total of 60 students (25 males, 35 females; Mage = 20.75, SDage = 
5.128) from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, who participated in Experiment 1. 
They were recruited through the Department of Psychology’s subject pool. The 
participants were randomly assigned to one of three presentation modalities: the text-only 
group (n = 20), the pictures-only group (n = 20), or the text-pictures group (n = 20). 
Materials 
Participants were presented with a Native American Indian folktale called The 
War of the Ghosts, taken from Bartlett’s (1932) original experiment. A brief 
questionnaire at the end of the experiment was used to ensure that they were not familiar 
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with the story when beginning the experiment and did not search for the story on the 
Internet or any outside sources throughout their participation in the experiment. The 
complete story is shown below. The numbers in parentheses represent the segmented 
sentences for each panel in the story (see Appendix D for details of the illustrated 
narrative). 
(1) One night, two young men from Egulac went down to the river to hunt seals,  
(2) and while they were there, it became foggy and calm.  
(3) Then they heard war-cries,  
(4) and they thought: "Maybe this is a war-party".  
(5)They escaped to the shore,  
(6) and hid behind a log.  
(7) Now canoes came up,  
(8) and they heard the noise of paddles,  
(9) and saw one canoe coming up to them.  
(10) There were five men in the canoe,  
(11) and they said: “What do you think? We wish to take you along.  
(12) We are going up the river to make war on the people." 
(13) One of the young men said, "I have no arrows." 
(14) "Arrows are in the canoe," they said. 
(15) "I will not go along.  
(16) I might be killed.  
(17) My relatives do not know where I have gone.  
(18) But you," he said, turning to the other, "may go with them." 
29 
 
(19) So, one of the young men went,  
(20) but the other returned home. 
(21) And the warriors went on up the river to a town on the other side of Kalama. 
(22) The people came down to the water,  
(23) and they began to fight,  
(24) and many were killed.  
(25) But presently the young man heard one of the warriors say, "Quick, let us go 
home: that Indian has been hit.  
(26) " Now he thought: "Oh, they are ghosts."  
(27) He did not feel sick,  
(28) but they said he had been shot. 
(29) So, the canoes went back to Egulac,  
(30) and the young man went ashore to his house,  
(31) and made a fire.  
(32) And he told everybody and said: "Behold I accompanied the ghosts, and we 
went to fight.  
(33) Many of our fellows were killed,  
(34) and many of those who attacked us were killed.  
(35) They said I was hit,  
(36) and I did not feel sick." 
(37) He told it all,  
(38) and then he became quiet.  
(39) When the sun rose, he fell down.  
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(40) Something black came out of his mouth.  
(41) His face became contorted.  
(42) The people jumped up and cried. 
(43) He was dead. 
In Experiment 1, the story was shown as text without pictures (i.e., text-only), pictures 
without text (i.e., pictures-only), or a combination of text and pictures (i.e., text-pictures). 
For all three groups, the story was broken down into 43 panels (i.e., pictures and / or text 
that were enclosed within a frame). The information for each panel was created by 
segmenting the story sentences following a similar structure provided by Mandler and 
Johnson (1977). 
For the pictures-only and text-pictures versions of the narrative, the pictures were 
drawn in black and white ink by Pj Perez, who is a professional comic artist 
(http://pjperez.com/) from an independent American comic book publishing company 
based in Las Vegas, NV, known as Pop! Goes the Icon 
(http://www.popgoestheicon.com/). The artist was instructed to draw images that 
followed the exact portrayal of the story, and experimenters in the Reasoning and 
Memory Lab (the author of this dissertation, another doctoral student, and a professor) 
consulted with the artist during the drawing process to monitor for any discrepancies 
found in the interpretation of the illustration. 
Design 
A 2 (Session: Day 1 and 2) X 3 (Presentation: Text-Only, Pictures-Only, or Text-
Pictures) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted. Session was a within-subjects 
variable, and presentation was a between-subjects variable. The dependent measures were 
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the recall propositions (idea units) that were accurate or elaborated (false). For correct 
recall, there were a total of 127 accurate idea units possible. A 2 (Encoding: First Time 
and Second Time) X 3 (Presentation: Text-Only, Pictures-Only, or Text-Pictures) design 
was also used for response times when analyzing how long the presentation groups 
processed the story. Encoding was a within-subjects variable, and presentation was a 
between-subjects variable. In addition, a one-way between-subjects ANOVA was used to 
compare the presentation modes for efficiency scores. 
Procedure 
The experiment was a two part session, with a 48 hour delay between sessions. 
For the first session, students were seated in front of the computer and randomly assigned 
to one of three groups: the text-only group, the pictures-only group, or the text-pictures 
group (see an example of the presentations on Appendix B). Participants in the text-only 
group were instructed to read through the story twice without any illustrations. 
Participants in the pictures-only group were instructed to carefully view the same story 
twice with pictures only. Participants in the text-pictures group were asked to read 
through the story and view the pictures twice – the panels that were shown in this group 
were formatted in a comic book style (i.e., the text and pictures were integrated and not 
separated like a children’s storybook). For all three groups, the story was presented one 
panel at a time on the computer, using the E-Prime experiment presentation software 
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). To advance to the next screen, they had to 
press the space bar; a 250 millisecond delay was included between each panel so that 
participants were aware of the transitions. After being presented with the story, the 
students were given a ten minute distracter task, playing Solitaire. Participants were then 
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asked to recall the story that they were presented with by typing on a computer, taking as 
much time as they needed to remember. The recall test was conducted on the Internet 
using the Qualtrics experiment presentation software (Qualtrics, 2013; 
http://www.qualtrics.com). The instructions were taken from a study by Bergman and 
Roediger (1999), but with some slight modifications depending on the presentation group 
the participants were assigned. See Appendix C for the recall instructions. In addition, a 
reflection questionnaire was added at the end of the recall test, asking them to rate how 
much attention they made for processing the multimedia sources in the story (see 
Appendices F and G). 
Once they completed the tasks for the first session, they were told that they would 
receive an email two days later for another recall session. In the second session, the 
participants were given a link to a Qualtrics website with instructions for the recall test. 
They were asked to type their recall of the story and to be as accurate as possible. Again, 
there was no time limit. After they completed the recall task, a reflection questionnaire 
asking them to rate their use of the text and / or pictures for remembering the story was 
given (see Appendices F and G) followed by a debriefing to inform the participants of the 
purpose of the study. Note that all of the ratings for the reflection questionnaires will be 
addressed in the General Discussion. 
Scoring. The participants’ recall for both sessions were scored based on the 
correct idea units for each panel. There were 127 correct idea units possible that the 
participants could remember. Ideas that were relevant to one of the 43 panels were 
counted as accurate, whereas ideas that did not correspond to any of the panels in the 
story were counted as elaborations (i.e., false idea units). 
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Results & Discussion 
 Experiment 1 consisted of three types of analyses. In the first analysis, the focus 
was on correct recall (i.e., correct idea units) and elaborations (i.e., false idea units). 
People were given two recall tests after reading The War of the Ghosts story, one 
immediate and another one 48 hours later. Overall, people took an average of 8.209 
minutes for the first recall test and 7.866 minutes for the second recall test. In the second 
analysis, people’s response times in minutes during the first and second reading and / or 
viewing of the story were assessed. In the last analysis, a costs and benefits analysis was 
conducted to obtain efficiency scores. These efficiency scores would determine whether 
the amount of accuracy or elaborations and the response times to process the story for 
each respective presentation group had an influence on people’s situation models and 
memory performance. All of the results were based on ANOVAs; post hoc tests were 
based on Bonferroni’s adjusted or pairwise comparisons (all ps < .05). 
Correct Recall 
Session (Day 1 and 2). As predicted, people recalled more correct idea units in 
Day 1 (M = 46.033, SE = 1.866) than in Day 2 (M = 42.133, SE = 2.001), demonstrating a 
forgetting effect proposed by Ebbinghaus (1885 / 1913), F (1, 57) = 22.002, MSE = 
20.739, p < .001, ηp2= .278 (see Figure 1). Although Ebbinghaus studied meaningless 
consonant-vowel-consonant information and showed forgetting, the current finding also 
suggests that meaningful information through text or pictures in a story can still be 
vulnerable to normal forgetting. 
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Figure 1. People recalled more correct idea units in Day 1 than in Day 2. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
Presentation (Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-Pictures). There was a 
statistically significant difference among the three presentation groups, F (2, 57) = 
51.992, MSE = 428.234, p < .001, ηp2= .646 (see Figure 2). The text-pictures group (M = 
63.225, SE = 3.272) recalled more correct idea units than the text-only (M = 51.300, SE = 
3.272) group, which recalled more correct idea units than the pictures-only group (M = 
17.725, SE = 3.272), all ps < .05. This finding supports the hypothesis that presenting text 
and pictures together provides a stronger contextual cue for forming a more accurate 
situation model. That is, when they produce mental representations from the text, their 
perceptual representation from the pictures may help to prevent any confusion or 
misunderstanding. The images in the narrative can contribute to their comprehension and 
memory of the story by allowing people to also form specific mental representations of 
what they should create for the text. 
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Additionally, the text-only group recalled more idea units than the pictures-only 
group due to having more contexts, or meaning, for the story. Another important factor is 
that with contextual cues given through text only, the group must rely heavily and 
actively on their mental images to maintain and organize information in memory. Unlike 
the text-pictures group, in which pictures assist with the processing of the information, 
the text-only group must use greater effort in forming their own situation models. A lack 
of attention to certain details of the story may have caused them to remember less than 
the text-pictures group. 
In contrast, the pictures-only group recalled fewer idea units because they had to 
rely more on their own interpretation of the story. Although the picture superiority effect 
may have played a role in helping people to encode the details of the story, their 
perceptual representation was limited to not having contextual cues for the narrative. 
Contrary to what was predicted about people being passive in forming their own mental 
representations when pictures are only given, they were able to construct a new situation 
model for the pictorial narrative. Through speculating and using their schemas, they 
connected the story together with their own new meaning. 
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Figure 2. The text-pictures group recalled more correct idea units than the text-only and 
pictures-only groups; the text-only group recalled more correct idea units than the 
pictures-only group. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Session X Presentation. A significant interaction was observed between session 
and presentation, F (2, 57) = 3.654, MSE = 20.739, p = .032, ηp2= .646 (see Figure 3). 
Normal forgetting occurred for the text-pictures and text-only groups and not for the 
pictures-only group between Day 1 and Day 2. The text-pictures group recalled more 
correct idea units in Day 1 (M = 65.550, SE = 3.231) than in Day 2 (M = 60.900, SE = 
3.465), t (19) = 3.261, p = .004, and the text-only group recalled more correct idea units 
in Day 1 (M = 54.400, SE = 3.231) than in Day 2 (M = 48.200, SE = 3.465), t (19) = 
3.233, p = .004. Again, this finding suggests that meaningful information is not resistant 
to normal forgetting. Because situation models are typically tested immediately or just 
once, not much has been researched exploring multiple sessions, especially for a recall 
task. However, in a study by Copeland, Radvansky, and Goodwin (2009), they showed 
that forgetting can still occur in situation models when people read an autobiographical 
story and are given memory tests for events about the protagonist after an eight to nine 
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day delay. Interestingly, they were also able to find reminiscence bumps (i.e., enhanced 
memories for distinct accomplishments or events in a person’s life), showing that not all 
situation models easily dissipate in memory. However, as for the current experiment, the 
short story did not have a logical chronology or a life-altering event that people could 
rely on to maintain the situation models over time. Therefore, the decrease in recall from 
Day 1 to Day 2 for the text-pictures and text-only groups may suggest that distinct 
retrieval cues are necessary to hold onto specific details in memory. No significant 
difference in recall was observed in the pictures-only group for Day 1 (M = 18.150, SE = 
3.231) and Day 2 (M = 17.300, SE = 3.465), t (19) = 1.188, p = .249. Because the 
pictures-only group relied more on their perceptual representation to interpret the story, 
they were limited to recalling accurate information during both days. Another possibility 
to consider here is that the lack of a drop-off for this group may have been to a floor 
effect, as much less information was correctly recalled by this group. 
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Figure 3. Normal forgetting in the number of correct idea units occurred for the text-
pictures and text-only groups but not for the pictures-only group between Day 1 and Day 
2. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Elaborations 
Session (Day 1 and 2). Contrary to what was predicted, there was no statistically 
significant main effect for session, F (1, 57) = .696, MSE = 3.460, p = .408, ηp2= .012 
(see Figure 4). They recalled a similar number of false idea units for Day 1 (M = 7.317, 
SE = .351) and Day 2 (M = 7.600, SE = .433). Although a null effect was shown, this 
finding still suggests that elaborations do exist. People are still likely to distort 
information as a way to make sense with what happened in the story over time (Bartlett, 
1932). 
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Figure 4. People elaborated similarly for Day 1 and Day 2. Error bars represent standard 
errors. 
Presentation (Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-Pictures). The results 
revealed a significant main effect for presentation, F (2, 57) = 25.118, MSE = 15.193, p < 
.001, ηp2= .012 (see Figure 5). The pictures-only group (M = 11.025, SE = .616) had more 
elaborations than the text-pictures (M = 5.675, SE = .616) and text-only (M = 5.675, SE = 
.616) groups, all ps < .001. No statistical differences were found between the text-
pictures and text-only groups, p > .05. Without having accurate details from the text, the 
pictures-only group had to rely more on their perceptual representation, using their 
schemas to form a new and coherent mental representation for the story. As Wade et al. 
(2002) found in their study, people can often blend in pictures with their imagination, 
causing them to falsely recall information. 
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Figure 5. The pictures-only group recalled more false idea units than the text-pictures and 
text-only groups. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Session X Presentation. A statistically significant interaction was found between 
session and presentation, F (2, 57) = 3.593, MSE = 3.460, p = .034, ηp2= .112 (see Figure 
6). The text-pictures group recalled more elaborations or false idea units in Day 2 (M = 
6.450, SE = .750) than in Day 1 (M = 4.900, SE = .608), t (19) = 2.259, p = .036. 
However, no statistical differences were observed for the text-only and pictures-only 
groups between Day 1 and Day 2. The text-only group recalled a similar number of false 
idea units for Day 1 (M = 5.750, SE = .608) and Day 2 (M = 5.600, SE = .750), t (19) = 
.281, p = .782, and the pictures-only group recalled a similar number of false idea units 
for Day 1 (M = 11.300, SE = .608) and Day 2 (M = 10.750, SE = .750), t (19) = 1.037, p = 
.313. Note that the pictures-only group still had the most elaborations compared to the 
text-pictures and text-only groups for both days. However, the finding for the text-
pictures group having more elaborations on the second recall test demonstrates that the 
combination of text and pictures are not impervious to false memories. Garry et al. (2007) 
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suggested that people can use pictures as a way to speculate and confirm details that may 
not exist in the text. 
 
Figure 6. The text-pictures group recalled more false idea units from Day 1 to Day 2, 
whereas no increase in elaborations was observed in Day 1 and 2 for the text-only and 
pictures-only groups. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Response Times of the Multimedia Sources 
 Encoding (First and Second Time). As predicted from the hypothesis, people 
were much slower in minutes for the first time (M = 3.182, SE = .147) encoding the story 
than the second time (M = 2.566, SE = .157), F (1, 57) = 13.119, MSE = .867, p < .001, 
ηp2= .187 (see Figure 7). This finding supports the study by Zwaan, Magliano, and 
Graesser (1995), in that people are slower to process information for the first time 
because they must build  a new situation model of the  narrative. 
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Figure 7. People took longer to process the story the first time than the second time. Error 
bars represent standard errors. 
 Presentation (Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-Pictures). There was a 
significant main effect for presentation, showing differences in response times among the 
three presentation groups, F (2, 57) = 14.730, MSE = 1.913, p < .001, ηp2= .341 (see 
Figure 8). Contrary to what was predicted, the text-pictures (M = 2.928, SE = .219) and 
pictures-only (M = 3.685, SE = .219) groups were slower than the text-only group (M = 
2.010, SE = .219), all ps < .05. There were no differences found between the text-pictures 
and pictures-only groups, p > .05. The text-pictures group may have taken longer to 
process the story because people must integrate information from the text and pictures 
together to get a more complete situation model in memory. With the longer response 
times for the pictures-only group, this finding may suggest that not all perceptual 
representations are processed rapidly. Because the pictures-only group did not have any 
context to understand the storyline, they may have taken longer so that they can form 
their own situation models for the narrative. 
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Figure 8. The text-pictures and pictures-only groups processed the story longer than the 
text-only group. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 Session X Presentation. There was no significant interaction between session 
and presentation, F (2, 57) = .779, MSE = .867, p = 464, ηp2= .027 (see Figure 9). The 
text-pictures (First Time: M = 3.254, SE = .255; Second Time: M = 2.602, SE = .272), 
text-only (First Time: M = 2.179, SE = .255; Second Time: M = 1.840, SE = .272), and 
pictures-only (First Time: M = 4.113, SE = .255; Second Time: M = 3.257, SE = .272) 
groups were slower during the first time encoding and faster during the second time 
encoding the story. Again, this pattern supports the finding by Zwaan, Magliano, and 
Graesser (1995) that mental representations are more established in the first than the 
second processing of the narrative. 
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Figure 9. The three presentation groups were slower during the first time reading / 
viewing the story than the second time. Error bars represent standard errors. 
The Costs and Benefits of Multimedia on Situation Models and Memories 
 The costs and benefits analysis was performed on the multimedia sources to 
determine whether the amount of time to process the story (i.e., in minutes) also 
influenced people’s accuracy or elaboration in producing their situation models and 
memories. An efficiency score was computed for the text-pictures, text-only, and 
pictures-only groups using the following formula:  
 
Scores that range higher on the efficiency score would represent more accurate situation 
models and memories based on the amount of time it takes them to process the 
multimedia source. Scores that range lower on the efficiency score would represent more 
elaborated or inaccurate situation models and memories for the story. 
The efficiency scores were statistically significant among the three presentation 
groups, F (2, 57) = 68.686, MSE = 39.069, p < .001, ηp2= .707 (see Figure 10). The 
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pictures-only group (M = 1.877, SE = 1.398) had the lowest efficiency score, lower than 
both the text-pictures (M = 23.008, SE = 1.398) and text-only (M = 20.666, SE = 1.398) 
groups, all ps < .001. There was no significant difference between the text-pictures and 
text-only groups; both showed high efficiency scores, p = .723. Even though processing 
time was longer for the pictures-only group, this occurrence did not deter them from 
making more elaborations. This finding may suggest that with pictures alone, people will 
use their own interpretation to satisfy their understanding of the story. However, 
processing time for the text-pictures and text-only groups may be important because it 
may allow them to build a stronger situation model for the context that they are given. 
Thus, this processing allows them to accurately recall details more. 
 
Figure 10. The text-pictures and text-only groups had higher efficiency scores than the 
pictures-only group. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 The purpose of Experiment 2 was to expand on the findings of Experiment 1 by 
examining how people process narrative changes for pictures and / or text. Experiment 2 
consisted of four parts. For the first part, the focus was to compare people’s correct recall 
(i.e., recalling accurate idea units) and elaborations (i.e., recalling false idea units) when 
presented with text-only, pictures-only, or text and pictures. These results were used to 
help determine whether the results from Experiment 1 can be replicated. For the second 
part, the focus was on what people monitor during their online reading or viewing of the 
comic book story. They were asked to make judgments during the story to determine if 
they observed certain changes in the events that caused them to form specific mental 
representations. The findings were based on their judgments for situation changes and 
response times for their online reading / viewing. For the third part, response times were 
assessed to determine whether there were differences in the text-only, pictures-only, and 
text-pictures groups when processing information to create situation models. For the 
fourth part, a costs and benefits analysis was performed to determine whether the length 
of time processing the narrative had an effect on people’s accuracy or elaborations of the 
story. 
 When forming situation models, Zwaan, Langston, and Graesser (1995) suggested 
that people monitor various aspects, such as space, time, characters, and objects to guide 
them through the story to maintain coherence. This theory is known as the Event 
Indexing model. Studies have demonstrated that when people identify these dimensional 
changes throughout the progression of a narrative, they are likely to slow down in their 
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ability to process the information. This slowdown occurs because people update, or link 
new information with relevant details already stored in long-term memory, to allow for 
comprehension. However, further research is needed to determine whether the formation 
of situation models for text only, pictures only, or text and pictures requires the same 
organization of these event indices to mentally represent the details of a story for later 
retrieval. The question remains of whether updating situation changes or shifts in the 
story allow the maintenance of certain mental representations to exist during recall over 
time. 
Hypotheses 
Correct Recall and Elaborations 
 The hypotheses for correct recall (accurate idea units) and elaborations (false idea 
units) were based on the outcome from Experiment 1. In examining correct recall, people 
would recall more correct idea units or propositions on Day 1 than on Day 2 due to 
normal forgetting. For the presentation modalities, the text-pictures group would recall 
more correct idea units than the text-only and pictures-only groups because the 
combination of text and pictures allows people to construct a stronger and more complete 
situation model. Additionally, the text-only group would recall more correct idea units 
than the pictures-only group because of more context and effort used to create a situation 
model. An interaction between session (Day 1 vs. Day 2) and presentation (text-only, 
pictures-only, and text-pictures groups) for correct recall was expected. The text-pictures 
and text-only groups would recall more idea units than the pictures-only group on Day 1, 
but the text-pictures group would recall more idea units than the text-only and pictures-
only groups on Day 2. This interaction would suggest that the text-pictures group would 
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have a stronger support system in creating a complete situation model than if text and 
pictures are presented separately. 
In examining elaborations, people would recall similar false idea units on Day 1 
and Day 2 because all of the groups are prone to forgetting and using their schema to 
connect the events of the story. When examining the presentation modalities, the 
pictures-only group would make more elaborations than the text-pictures and text-only 
groups. This main effect would occur because the pictures-only group would rely more 
on their schemas and interpretation of the story instead of the details found in the text. An 
interaction between session and presentation was predicted for the elaborations. The 
pictures-only group would recall more false idea units than the text-pictures and text-only 
groups on Day 1 and Day 2 because of their reliance on their own schemas and 
imagination to form a coherent story. 
Judgments and Response Times 
To examine judgments and response times for the Event Indexing analysis, 
regression analyses were performed. Because judgment responses were a categorical 
variable, logistic regressions were used. Also, because response times were a ratio 
variable, multiple regressions were used. Each person’s judgments or response times 
were set as an independent criterion and the event dimensions / situation shifts (i.e., 
space, time, characters, and objects) that were coded by the experimenter were set as the 
predictors. The predictors were forced entered into each regression and then the 
standardized regression coefficients (beta weights) for each dimension were extracted 
from each participant’s analysis to determine the variance taken into account between the 
predictors and the criterion. Because there was no way of standardizing beta weights in 
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logistic regressions on SPSS, a formula was used to create the beta weights for judgments 
(see Appendix E; King, 2007). The beta weights for judgments and response times were 
analyzed using single sample t-tests to determine whether people detected situation 
changes for the dimensions. Beta weights that were significantly different than zero 
demonstrated that the dimensional shifts were reliably detected (Lorch & Myers, 1990). 
For the judgment responses, there were two analyses conducted, once for the first 
time they read and / or viewed the story and the second for the next time that they read 
and / or viewed the story. During the first time when the participants were presented with 
the story, it was predicted that the text-pictures group would be able to detect changes for 
space, time, characters, and objects because they would rely on both pictures and text to 
update their mental representations for the changes. However, the text-only and pictures-
only groups may not have the same advantage as the text-pictures group. For instance, for 
the text-only group, they may ignore changes for objects when they do not involve an 
explicit functional relationship in the story (e.g., a man using arrows to go to war; see 
Radvansky & Copeland, 2000 for details about functionality). For the pictures-only 
group, they may not be able to detect character changes because they were not given any 
other details about the characters beyond the images that they see for the first time. 
However, during the second time of reading and / or viewing the story, the text-pictures, 
text-only, and pictures-only groups were predicted to show judgments that reflected the 
situation changes similarly because they would be able to fill in parts of the situation 
model that they neglected to see during the first presentation (i.e., they would improve 
after having read / viewed the story once to give them a better understanding of the 
story). 
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The response times were also analyzed for the first and second time they read and 
/ or viewed the story. Research has shown that updating situation shifts causes people to 
slow down in their processing time so that new information can be integrated with prior 
knowledge in memory. For both times that the story was presented, the text-pictures, text-
only, and pictures-only groups would be expected to slow down for most of the event 
dimensions. However, certain situation shifts, such as space, may not follow the same 
pattern at least for the first time when they are shown the story (Zwaan et al., 1995). 
Instead, processing changes in location during the construction of a situation model may 
be due to automaticity or people’s common experience of transitioning from one location 
to another (Radvansky & Copeland, 2010). Another issue to take into account would be 
the possibility that response times may be associated with judgment responses. Thus, for 
the text-only group, response times may be rapid during the first time reading because of 
the lack of functionality that would be perceived during processing. In addition, for the 
pictures-only group, the response times may be fast for character changes because they 
may perceive all of the characters as similar throughout the story. 
Response Times of the Multimedia Sources 
 Based on the outcome of Experiment 1, people should have a slower response 
time (i.e., an increase in minutes) to process the story for the first time than the second 
time reading / viewing the story because they need to build up a situation model. Once 
mental representations have been established, they are likely to process the story more 
quickly for the second time than the first time due to familiarity. Zwaan, Magliano, and 
Graesser (1995) found that people would attend to other information (e.g., certain event 
dimensions) that they did not attend to during the first time. When examining the 
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presentation groups, the findings from Experiment 1 suggest that the text-pictures and 
pictures-only groups should process the narrative longer than the text-only group. 
Specifically, the text-pictures group should take longer because they must integrate the 
text and pictures into a well-connected story. The pictures-only group should take longer 
to process the information because they must use their perceptual representation to create 
their own meaningful situation model. The text-only group should take less time than the 
other two presentation groups because they only need to create mental images based on 
what they read only. No significant interaction was predicted to occur between encoding 
and presentation because the three presentation groups would process first reading / 
viewing longer and the second reading / viewing quicker. 
The Costs and Benefits of Multimedia on Situation Models and Memories 
 As in Experiment 1, the following formula was used to assess how people’s 
correct recall and elaborations were influenced by the amount of time they spent 
processing the text-only, pictures-only, and text-pictures version of the narrative. 
 
A high efficiency score represented situation models and memories that were more 
accurate after the length of time reading and / or viewing the story. A low efficiency 
score meant that the situation models and memories were greatly affected by elaborations 
(more false idea units) based on the amount of time processing the story. The text-
pictures and text-only groups would have the higher mean efficiency scores relative to 
the pictures-only groups because of the context that they are able to rely on when 
processing the story. In contrast, the pictures-only group would show the lowest mean 
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efficiency score because they would use their perceptual representations more, causing 
them to elaborate on the story. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty students (26 males, 34 females; Mage = 19.50, SDage = 2.198) from the 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas were recruited through the Department of Psychology’s 
subject pool for research credit and did not take part in Experiment 1. They were 
randomly assigned to one of three presentation modality groups: text-only (n = 20), 
pictures-only (n = 20), or text-pictures (n = 20). None of the participants were familiar 
with the story that they were presented.  
Design 
A 2 (Session: Day 1 and 2) X 3 (Presentation: Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-
Pictures) mixed factorial ANOVA was performed with session being a within-subjects 
variable, and presentation being a between-subjects variable. The dependent measures 
were the recall of the propositions or idea units for accurate and elaborated memories of 
the story. For correct recall, there were a total of 127 accurate idea units possible. A 2 
(Encoding: First Time and Second Time) X 3 (Presentation: Text-Only, Pictures-Only, 
vs. Text-Pictures) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted to examine the response times 
people take to process the story based on their respective multimedia presentation. 
Encoding was a within-subjects variable, and presentation was a between-subjects 
variable. A one-way between-subject ANOVA was also performed to examine the 
efficiency scores or the costs and benefits of processing the story through text-pictures, 
text-only, or pictures-only. 
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In addition, an a priori analysis was conducted separately for the text-only, 
pictures-only, and text-pictures version of the story to determine whether people 
identified situation shifts in the story for space, time, and entity (i.e., characters and 
objects). For each of the dimensions, a “0” indicated no shift or change in the panel and a 
“1” indicated a shift or change in the panel. These changes for each dimension were used 
for regression analyses to later determine whether people’s judgments and response times 
corresponded to the changes that occur for space, time, characters, and objects in the 
narrative. 
Space. Space was identified as a change in location. If the event took place in the 
same area between two panels, then the second panel would be coded as a “0”, indicating 
that there was no shift or change. In contrast, if the event took place in a different area 
from the previous panel, then the second panel was coded as a “1”, signifying that there 
was a spatial shift. Different perspectives of the same location (e.g., a different “camera 
angle” within the same area) for the pictures-only or text-pictures version were not be 
considered as a spatial shift. 
Time. Time was defined as changes that occur in the sequence of the story. This 
dimension was often represented through the actions presented in the narrative. For 
instance, if the two young men were not hunting seals anymore and are hiding behind a 
log, this action was considered a temporal change. When the panel did not show a change 
in time, the panel was coded as a “0”. When the panel showed a different time than the 
previous panel, the panel was coded as a “1”.  
Entity (Characters and Objects). Entity was identified as changes in the 
entrance of a character or object. Thus, entity was broken down and classified as two 
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separate variables. Coding was based on when they entered or were present for the first 
time in a given event. For character, a situation change was identified if the character was 
out of sight during an important action sequence but entered into the scene again. For the 
pictures-only or text-pictures version, there was no shift if two characters had a direct 
conversation with each other but one of the characters disappeared temporarily from the 
current panel. For object, a situation change was observed if the object entered with a 
purpose in the story (e.g., arrows to make war) or if prominent characters were carrying 
or focusing on the object. An object that was out of sight during a panel but re-entered 
during a later scene in the pictures-only or text-pictures version were identified as a shift. 
In general, a panel was considered a “0” if the same characters or objects were in the 
panel and a “1” if new characters or objects entered in the panel. 
Other Variables. Although the main focus of the regression analyses in the Event 
Indexing model is the situation changes for the event dimensions mentioned above, other 
variables, such as the number of items viewed in each panel for pictures and the number 
of syllables for text, were included for response time purposes. These two variables were 
used to ensure that they did not confound the outcome of the regressions by influencing 
delays in response times when people processed information for materials that were 
either presented in text or pictures. Therefore, they were added into the analyses when 
necessary. For the items in the panels, they were counted individually based on clothing 
(e.g., necklaces, vest, pants, etc.), paraphernalia (e.g., weapons, canoes, paddles, etc.), 
and location items (e.g., sky, trees, river, etc.). For the number of syllables, every word in 
the sentence or phrase of each panel was counted. 
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Materials and Procedure 
Similar to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 consisted of two sessions. During the first 
session, the participants were seated in front of a computer and randomly assigned to the 
text-only, pictures-only, or text- pictures version of the Native American Indian folktale 
known as The War of the Ghosts (Bartlett, 1932). The participants in each of the groups 
indicated that they were not familiar with the story before taking part in the experiment. 
As in Experiment 1, a questionnaire at the end was used to make sure that they also did 
not search for the story on the Internet or from other outside sources throughout the 
duration of this experiment. Different reflection questionnaires were also given after each 
recall test in Day 1 and Day 2, asking participants to rate their attention and use of either 
the text and / or pictures for remembering the story (see Appendices F and G). Note that 
these reflection questionnaires are only addressed in the General Discussion section. The 
story was presented in 43 panels, shown individually on a computer screen using the E-
Prime software. As they went through the story, the participants were instructed to 
identify whether there was a change in the event or situation in each panel. They were 
asked to use their best judgment for what constituted a change without the experimenters 
giving a specific definition for a situation change. This procedure was similar to a study 
conducted by Magliano et al. (2001), in which participants were asked to identify 
changes in a film they watched without any explanation of what the experimenters 
interpreted as situation changes. For this experiment, if there was no change in the panel, 
they had to type ‘S’ on the keyboard (later coded as “0”) for same event or situation. If a 
change occurred in the panel, they had to type ‘N’ on the keyboard (later coded as “1”) 
for new event or situation. By typing ‘S’ or ‘N,’ they were able to advance to the next 
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panel on the computer screen. After they completed two readings / viewings of the story, 
they played Solitaire on the computer for ten minutes as a distracter. Then, they were 
asked to recall the story that they were shown by typing it online through Qualtrics 
without any time restrictions. Once they completed the recall task, the experimenter 
notified them that their second session would take place two days later. For the second 
session, participants were given a link for Qualtrics via email, asking them to go to the 
webpage to recall the story that they were presented previously. The recall test had no 
time limit. After they completed the recall task, the participants were taken to the 
debriefing webpage to inform them of the purpose of the study. 
Results & Discussion 
 Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1 except that the organization of 
situation models was further explored using the Event Indexing model. There were four 
types of analyses conducted in this experiment. In the first analysis, people’s memory 
performance was assessed using correct recall (i.e., correct idea units) and elaborations 
(i.e., false idea units). Like in Experiment 1, there were two recall tests, spread out in a 
two day period. Overall, people took an average of 7.607 minutes to recall the first test 
and 7.107 minutes to recall the second test. In the second analysis, the Event Indexing 
model, in which people were instructed to monitor situation changes in the story, was 
performed. This procedure measured their judgments and response times as a way to 
determine whether people’s detection of situation changes correspond to changes in 
space, time, characters, and objects. In the third analysis, response times in minutes were 
assessed to examine whether processing is affected by the type of multimedia source (i.e., 
text-pictures, text-only, or pictures-only). In the last analysis, a costs and benefits analysis 
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was conducted to measure efficiency scores for the three presentation groups. All 
analyses were performed using ANOVAs, and post hoc tests were derived from 
Bonferroni’s adjusted or pairwise comparisons. 
Correct Recall  
 Session (Day 1 and 2). There was a significant main effect for Session (Day 1 
and Day 2), F (1, 57) = 19.322, MSE = 16.908, p < .001, ηp2= .253 (see Figure 11). 
People recalled more correct idea units in Day 1 (M = 39.217, SE = 1.483) than in Day 
2(M = 35.917, SE = 1.343), demonstrating a normal forgetting effect as proposed by 
Ebbinghaus (1885 / 1913). 
 
Figure 11. People recalled more correct idea units in Day 1 than in Day 2. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
Presentation (Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-Pictures). A significant main 
effect was observed for the three presentation groups, F (2, 57) = 110.914, MSE = 
223.297, p < .001, ηp2= .796 (see Figure 12). Specifically, the results showed that the 
text-pictures group (M = 62.075, SE = 2.363) recalled more correct idea units than the 
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text-only group (M = 38.300, SE = 2.363), and the text-only group recalled more correct 
idea units than the pictures-only group (M = 12.325, SE = 2.363), all ps < .001. When 
giving people text and pictures to encode the story relative to giving them only one of the 
multimedia sources, their recall accuracy was high, suggesting that context, or 
meaningfulness, and the integration of text and pictures can strengthen people’s situation 
models and memory. Although the text-only group did not recall similar correct idea 
units as the text-pictures group, the text-only group still exhibited strong memory 
accuracy. This finding indicates that context is not only an important factor but that the 
mental effort to create an accurate situation model in text promotes greater encoding and 
storage in memory. Like Experiment 1, the pictures-only group continued to recall fewer 
correct idea units. This pattern suggests that when perceptual representations are only 
available, people do not necessarily have a complete understanding of the story to create 
an accurate situation model. 
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Figure 12. The text-pictures group recalled more correct idea units than the text-only and 
pictures-only groups; the text-only group recalled more correct idea units than the 
pictures-only group. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Session X Presentation. A significant interaction for correct recall was found 
between session and presentation, F (2, 57) = 10.692, MSE = 223.297, p < .001, ηp2= .273 
(see Figure 13). There was a marginally significant decrease in recalling correct idea 
units for the text-pictures group from Day 1 (M = 63.450, SE = 2.568) to Day 2 (M = 
60.700, SE = 2.327), t (19) = 1.771, p = .093. The text-only group also recalled fewer 
correct idea units from Day 1 (M = 42.200, SE = 2.568) to Day 2 (M = 34.400, SE = 
2.327), t (19) = 5.193, p < .001. No recall differences of correct idea units were found for 
the pictures-only group between Day 1 (M = 12.000, SE = 2.568) and Day 2 (M = 12.650, 
SE = 2.327), t (19) = 1.771, p = .093. People in the text-pictures and text-only groups 
recalled slightly fewer correct idea units in Day 2 compared to Day 1. This finding 
suggests that situation models are not as easily maintained over time without the use of 
strong retrieval cues. In studies examining situation models, recognition probes have 
typically been used to activate memories of their mental representations, specifically in 
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some form of immediate testing. However, this study used subsequent recall tests, 
requiring people to make their own retrieval cues. As a result, their situation models 
showed degradation over a two day period. As stated earlier when discussing the results 
of Experiment 1, the pictures-only group showed no difference in forgetting between Day 
1 and Day 2 because their recall for the correct idea units during both days was already 
low. Although there may have been a picture superiority effect for the pictures-only 
group, their perceptual representations was not enough to interpret the details of the story 
accurately. 
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Figure 13. The text-pictures and text-only groups recalled fewer correct idea units in Day 
2 than in Day 1 relative to the pictures-only group, showing normal forgetting. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
Elaborations 
 Session (Day 1 and 2). In examining elaborations, there was a significant main 
effect for session, F (1, 57) = 8.010, MSE = 2.922, p = .006, ηp2= .123 (see Figure 14). 
People recalled more false idea units in Day 2 (M = 8.417, SE = .429) than in Day 1 (M = 
7.533, SE = .363). This outcome was not like Experiment 1 although it should be noted 
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that in Experiment 1 it was a null effect, not an opposite effect. This pattern was similar 
to other studies, in which more elaborations occurred over time (e.g., Bergman & 
Roediger, 1999). Bartlett (1932) suggested that these elaborations are due to 
rationalization and distortions to make information more understandable. 
 
Figure 14. People recalled more false idea units in Day 2 than in Day 1. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
Presentation (Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-Pictures). A significant main 
effect was also found for the three presentation groups, F (2, 57) = 6.188, MSE = 16.035, 
p = .004, ηp2= .178 (see Figure 15). People in the pictures-only group (M = 9.775, SE = 
.633) made more elaborations than the text-pictures (M = 6.850, SE = .633) and text-only 
groups (M = 7.300, SE = .633), both ps < .05; the text-pictures and text-only groups 
showed no significant difference in elaborations, p > .05. This finding was similar to 
Experiment 1, demonstrating that without context, people are more likely to make more 
false idea units to make sense of the story. The pictures-only group had to rely on their 
perceptual representations to create their own meaningful mental representation. 
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Figure 15. The pictures-only group recalled more false idea units than the text-pictures 
and text-only groups. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Session X Presentation. There was a significant interaction between session and 
presentation for elaborations, F (2, 57) = 3.510, MSE = 2.922, p = .037, ηp2= .110 (see 
Figure 16). The text-pictures and text-only groups made more elaborations in Day 2 than 
in Day 1 compared to the pictures-only group. The text-pictures group showed an 
increase in false idea units recalled from Day 1 (M = 6.000, SE = .628) to Day 2 (M = 
7.700, SE = .744), t (19) = 2.635, p = .016, and the text-only group showed a similar 
pattern from Day 1 (M = 6.700, SE = .628) to Day 2 (M = 7.900, SE = .744), t (19) = 
2.303, p = .033. No significant difference in elaborations was observed for the pictures-
only group in Day 1 (M = 9.900, SE = .628) and Day 2 (M = 9.650, SE = .744), t (19) = 
.575, p = .572, but they still recalled the highest number of false idea units for both days 
than the other two presentation groups. Contrary to what was observed in Experiment 1, 
the text-only group (like the text-pictures group) elaborated more in Day 2. This outcome 
may suggest that they may not be resistant to false recall either. Although accuracy is 
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high for the text-pictures and text-only groups, elaborations may be used as a way to 
connect information that may not make sense or that people do to recover information 
that has been forgotten. For the pictures-only group, their elaborations were both high for 
both days because they had to rely on their interpretation of the pictures to comprehend 
what is going on in the narrative. 
 
Figure 16. The text-pictures and text-only groups recalled more false idea units from Day 
1 to Day 2 than the pictures-only group. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Judgments and Response Times 
 Text-Pictures Group. For the judgment responses during the first reading / 
viewing of the story, the beta weights from the single sample t-test showed significance 
for time, t (19) = 2.654, p = .016, and characters, t (19) = 4.705, p < .001 (see Table 1). 
As changes occurred in the panels for time (B = .133) and characters (B = .094), people 
were likely to identify situation changes as well. During the second reading / viewing of 
the story, judgment responses were significant for space, t (19) = -2.698, p = .014, time, t 
(19) = 4.006, p < .001, and characters, t (19) = 3.783, p < .001 (see Table 1). Although 
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space was significant, the beta weight showed that people’s judgments were less likely to 
correspond to location changes when they were present (B = -.076). However, when 
changes occurred for time (B = .187) and characters (B = .166), their judgments 
corresponded to those changes. 
 In examining response times for the text-pictures group, two other variables were 
included in the regression model before the beta weights were analyzed. They were items 
in the panels (i.e., the number of items pictured in each panel) and the number of 
syllables. These variables were added to make sure that they did not influence the 
response times for the other beta weights. That is, rather than slowdowns in response 
times being due to situational shifts, they could simply be a result of superficial 
characteristics such as the number of items or number of syllables; thus, these factors 
were also included in the analyses.  
Using the single sample t-test for the first reading and viewing of the story, the 
findings showed a significant difference for time, t (19) = 4.663, p < .001, characters, t 
(19) = 6.525, p < .001, items in the panels, t (19) = -3.361, p = .003, and syllables, t (19) 
= 14.069, p < .001 (see Table 1). The beta weights for time (B = .221) and characters (B = 
.212) indicated that as changes occurred for these event dimensions in the story, people 
were likely to slow down due to an updating effect. In addition, they were likely to slow 
down when more syllables were present in the panel (B = .448). However, for the number 
of items in the panels, the beta weight showed that people were still faster to respond 
even when there were more items in the pictures that they processed (B = -.123). During 
the second reading and viewing of the story, the single sample t-tests revealed a 
significant difference in response times for space, t (19) = -4.061, p < .001, time, t (19) = 
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3.043, p = .007, characters, t (19) = -2.663, p = .015, and syllables, t (19) = 12.349, p < 
.001 (see Table 1). For space, even though the beta weight for the event dimension was 
significant, people were likely to respond faster when locations changed in the story (B = 
-.136). Similar to the first reading and viewing of the story, people were slower for 
changes for time (B =.120) and characters (B = .091) when they occurred in the story. 
They were also likely to slow down when the number of syllables increased in the panels 
(B = .345). 
Table 1 
 
Judgment and Response Time Beta Weights for the Text-Pictures Group 
     
Event Indices 
Judgments 
(First 
Reading / 
Viewing)  
Judgments 
(Second 
Reading / 
Viewing) 
Response Times 
(First Reading / 
Viewing) 
Response Times 
(Second Reading / 
Viewing) 
Space -0.002 -0.076* -0.094 -0.136** 
Time  0.133*  0.187***  0.221***  0.120** 
Characters  0.094***  0.166***  0.212***  0.091* 
Objects -0.072 -0.011  0.033 -0.007 
Items in the 
Panels ---- ---- -0.123**  0.032 
Syllables ---- ----  0.448***  0.345*** 
     Note. * p < .05, two-tailed. ** p < .01, two-tailed. *** p < .001, two-tailed. 
      Text-Only Group. The single sample t-tests for the first reading judgments 
showed a significant difference for space, t (19) = 4.123, p < .001, and time, t (19) = 
2.844, p < .01 (see Table 2). As changes occurred for space (B = .070) and time (B = 
.067) in the story, they were able to detect situation changes as well. A similar pattern 
was observed for the second reading judgments, in which people detected situation 
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changes when there were changes for space (B = .202), t (19) = 2.830, p = .011, and time 
(B = 154), t (19) = 3.183, p = .005 (see Table 2). 
 For response times, the number of syllables was added into the regression 
analyses before extracting the beta weights for each participant. Using the single samples 
t-tests, significant differences were found for the beta weights for the first reading of the 
story in space, t (19) = 4.590, p < .001, time, t (19) = 2.940, p = .008, characters, t (19) = 
2.439, p = .025, and syllables, t (19) = 9.546, p < .001 (see Table 2). People were likely 
to slow down when event changes were present for space (B = 157), time (B = .078), and 
characters (B = .094) due to having to update new information into their situation models. 
They were also slower when the number of syllables increased in the story. For the 
second time reading through the story, the single samples t-tests revealed no significant 
differences for the event indices (p > .05) except for syllables, , t (19) = 10.819, p < .001 
(see Table 2). As more syllables were present in the panels, they were likely to slow 
down (B = .524). 
Table 2 
 
Judgment and Response Time Beta Weights for the Text-Only Group 
     
Event 
Indices 
Judgments 
(First 
Reading) 
Judgments 
(Second 
Reading) 
Response Times 
(First Reading)  
Response Times 
(Second Reading) 
Space 0.070** 0.202* 0.157***  0.014 
Time 0.067** 0.154** 0.078**  0.012 
Characters 0.016 0.005 0.094* -0.052 
Objects 0.019 0.018 0.040 -0.027 
Syllables ---- ---- 0.459***  0.524*** 
     Note. * p < .05, two-tailed. ** p < .01, two-tailed. *** p < .001, two-tailed. 
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 Pictures-Only Group. For judgments, the beta weights were only significant for 
space, t (19) = -2.658, p = .016, and objects, t (19) = -2.861, p = .010, during the first 
viewing (see Table 3). Although both event dimensions were statistically significant, the 
patterns showed that people did not detect situation changes when shifts in location (B = -
.198) and objects (B = -.057) were present. No significant differences were observed in 
the event indices for the beta weights during the second viewing of the story, p > .05 (see 
Table 3). 
 For response times, the number of items shown in each panel was included in the 
regression analysis to ensure that the beta weights were not influenced by the length of 
time people took to process the story. The beta weights from the single sample t-tests 
were only significant for space, t (19) = 3.420, p = .003, characters, t (19) = 5.494, p < 
.001, and items in the panels, t (19) = - 2.958, p = .008, for the first viewing (see Table 
3). When there were changes for space (B = .174) and characters (B = .208), people 
tended to slow down to update new mental representations into their memory. Although 
the variable for items in the panels was significant, the beta weight indicated that people 
were faster to respond to the panels regardless of how many items were in the pictures (B 
= -.084). There were no significant differences detected for the second time they viewed 
the pictures in the story, p > .05 (see Table 3). 
 Overall, from the three presentation groups, object shifts were not as prominent 
when detecting situation changes in people’s judgments and response times. A possibility 
for why object changes did not correspond to their situation models is that they did not 
have a functional relationship to the characters (Radvansky & Copeland, 2000) or there 
were not a lot of object changes that occurred for people to notice as a situation change 
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while reading or viewing the story. In addition, the results showed many inconsistencies 
for the other event dimensions. This issue will be discussed in the General Discussion. 
Table 3 
 
Judgment and Response Time Beta Weights for the Pictures-Only Group 
     
Event Indices 
Judgments 
(First 
Viewing) 
Judgments 
(Second 
Viewing) 
Response Times 
(First Viewing) 
Response Times 
(Second Viewing) 
Space -0.198* -0.124  0.174**  0.065 
Time  0.102  0.064  0.016 -0.059 
Characters -0.003 -0.028  0.208***  0.014 
Objects -0.057**  0.119  0.048 -0.005 
Items in the 
Panels ---- ---- -0.084**  0.026 
     Note. * p < .05, two-tailed. ** p < .01, two-tailed. *** p < .001, two-tailed. 
 
Response Times of the Multimedia Sources 
The response times in minutes were assessed to examine whether people’s ability 
to form situation models is associated with the length of time people process the text-
pictures, text-only, or pictures-only version of the story. 
 Encoding (First and Second Time). Similar to Experiment 1, people took longer 
to process the story during the first time (M = 3.362, SE = .136) relative to the second 
time (M = 2.162, SE = .098) reading / viewing the story, F (1, 57) = 87.222, MSE = .495, 
p < .001, ηp2= .605 (see Figure 17). This finding is similar to the study by Zwaan, 
Magliano, and Graesser (1995) when they gave participants text narratives twice. This 
finding suggests that people take longer to process the first reading / viewing of the story 
to build some form of situation model, whereas they take less time to process the second 
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reading / viewing of the story because they are now re-establishing the information that 
they have already created in their situation model.  
 
Figure 17. People took longer processing the story during the first time than the second 
time. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Presentation (Text-Only, Pictures-Only, vs. Text-Pictures). There was a 
significant main effect for presentation, F (2, 57) = 12.305, MSE = 2.388, p < .001, ηp2= 
.302 (see Figure 18). However, unlike Experiment 1, the text-pictures (M = 3.357, SE = 
.173) and text-only (M = 2.783, SE = .173) groups processed the story much longer than 
the pictures-only (M = 2.146, SE = .173) group, all ps < .05. In addition, there was a 
marginally significant difference observed between the text-pictures and text-only 
groups, p = .067. One possibility for why the outcome of the pictures-only group 
occurred was that instead of people focusing on the story itself, they may have attended 
to whether there were changes in the situation of the story without putting much effort in 
creating some form of context or meaning. However, the patterns for the text-pictures and 
text-only groups were similar to Experiment 1. The text-pictures group took longer to 
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process the story than the text-only group. The findings suggest that the integration of 
text and pictures affects how information is processed in memory. Specifically, they must 
use their mental representations for the text and ensure that the pictures correspond to 
their own created mental images of the story and vice versa. Unlike the text-pictures 
group, the text-only group only relied on their mental images only, causing no delays in 
encoding the details of the narrative. 
 
 
Figure 18. The text-pictures group processed the story longer than the text-only and 
pictures-only groups, followed by the text-only group processing the story longer than the 
pictures-only group. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Encoding X Presentation. There was no significant interaction between 
encoding and presentation, F (2, 57) = .650, MSE = .495, p = .526, ηp2= .022 (see Figure 
19). The text-pictures (First Time: M = 4.005, SE = .236; Second Time: M = 2.710, SE = 
.169), text-only (First Time: M = 3.438, SE = .236; Second Time: M = 2.128, SE = .169), 
and pictures-only (First Time: M = 2.642, SE = .236; Second Time: M = 1.650, SE = 
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.169) groups processed the story longer during the first time of reading / viewing than the 
second time, showing a pattern similar to the study by Zwaan et al. (1995). 
 
Figure 19. All of the presentation groups read / viewed the story longer during the first 
time than the second time. Error bars represent standard errors. 
The Costs and Benefits of Multimedia on Situation Models and Memories 
 A costs and benefits analysis was conducted to examine if the length time to 
process the text-only, pictures-only, and text-pictures story affects the accuracy or 
elaborations of people’s recall. Efficiency scores were assessed by using the following 
formula: 
 
High efficiency scores showed that people’s situation models and memories were 
accurate when processing the story. Low efficiency scores showed that their situation 
models and memories were driven more by elaborations or inaccurate details. 
There was a statistically significant difference among the three presentation 
groups, F (2, 57) = 65.439, MSE = 19.902, p < .001, ηp2= .697 (see Figure 20). The 
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pictures-only group (M = 1.302, SE = .998) had the lowest efficiency scores, significantly 
lower than the text-only group (M = 11.553, SE = .998), p < .001, which was significantly 
lower than the text-pictures group (M = 17.223, SE = .998), p < .001. Like Experiment 1, 
this result suggests that the pictures-only group may rely greatly on elaborations to 
understand the story. Even with a low processing time, the pictures-only group will 
organize and interpret the narrative in their own way. However, the text-pictures group 
had a significantly higher mean efficiency score than the text-only group. This difference 
suggests that by processing both text and pictures as well as identifying changes 
occurring in the story, people are able to encode and organize more details for their 
situation models in memory. 
 
 
Figure 20. The text-pictures group had the highest mean efficiency score than the text-
only and pictures-only group; the text-only group had a higher mean efficiency score than 
the pictures-only group. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 In this dissertation, Experiments 1 and 2 were conducted to examine how people 
form situation models in multimedia through text and pictures. Using Bartlett’s (1932) 
The War of the Ghosts story, people were tested on their recall for the narrative during a 
two day period. The findings showed that they had normal forgetting and more 
elaborations (e.g., schemas, rationalizations, distortions) from Day 1 to Day 2, which is 
consistent with previous studies that have found that memories continue to be 
reconstructive when the narrative is given visually (as in reading through text only) or 
aurally (see Kellogg, 2007; Ross & Millsom, 1970). In addition, previous studies have 
shown that people were likely to forget information from the text and then create false 
memories, regardless of whether they were told to retell or remember the story (Bergman 
& Roediger, 1999). This dissertation differed from those studies in that it used a 
manipulation that has yet to be investigated, which is the use of an illustrated version of 
the narrative to understand how information is stored and retrieved during subsequent 
recall tests. In addition, this dissertation focused on how both accurate and false 
memories are influenced by textual or pictorial mental representations. 
A New Perspective on Situation Models and Multimedia 
 According to Mayer’s (2005) cognitive theory of multimedia learning, people can 
process information and create mental representations using both a verbal and pictorial 
model. To put it simply, the verbal model is considered as situation models that are text-
based information, and the pictorial model is considered as situation models that are 
image-based information. Mayer indicated that these two models can work together or 
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separately depending on how the information is presented. For instance, when text and 
pictures are shown together, people can integrate or independently use their verbal and 
pictorial models for comprehension. Similarly, when text or pictures are presented 
individually, they can activate the verbal or pictorial models alone, respectively. 
However, this theory is limited in that there is not much information detailing how these 
verbal and pictorial models operate to create those mental representations so that 
information is stored in memory.  
In this dissertation, the purpose was to specifically identify how mental 
representations for text and pictures are created during the processing of information into 
their verbal and pictorial models. If these mental representations are created, another 
aspect to consider was to investigate how they are organized, stored, and maintained over 
time. The findings from Experiments 1 and 2 provided a new perspective for 
understanding the cognitive theory of multimedia learning in the realm of narratives. To 
thoroughly discuss the function of how situation models are constructed and remembered 
through multimedia, the focus will be divided into the encoding process and the storage / 
retrieval process. 
To examine the encoding process, people were asked to rate at the end of their 
first recall session about whether they attended to the text and / or pictures in the story 
(see Appendices F and G). These questions were used to ensure that some form of 
processing was involved based on the multimedia presentation that they were given. 
Because the descriptive responses were similar in both experiments, they were assessed 
altogether. For the text-pictures group, people rated their attention to the text and pictures 
similarly, showing that there was no bias for one multimedia mode over the other. When 
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given only one type of modality (i.e., text or pictures), people also rated highly for their 
respective groups. That is, the text-only group rated highly for attending to the text in the 
story, and the pictures-only group rated highly for attending to the pictures in the story. 
Thus, this finding is consistent with Mayer’s (2005) theory in that people do channel in 
mental representations into their verbal or pictorial models when information is selected 
from the text or pictures. 
However, unlike Mayer’s theory, the findings from people’s correct recall and 
elaborations may suggest that there is much more to how the encoding process works. 
For the verbal model, it seems that people are capable of creating their mental 
representations easily from the text due to having contextual cues for the story. 
Specifically, the text-pictures and text-only groups had high memory accuracy because 
they had unambiguous details of what was happening in the narrative (provided in the 
text). If pictures are also involved with the text, their memories are strengthened by the 
integration. However, Mayer’s pictorial model may operate more differently than how it 
is proposed. Currently, the pictorial model is considered as a single representation for any 
images being processed. Contrary to this idea, the pictorial model may actually be 
organized into two types of representations; they are perceptual and situation model-
based. Perceptual representations are specific, in that information is derived by the details 
of the images during encoding; this may allow for picture-superiority effects to occur. 
However, this type of representation may play a passive role for encoding because the 
focus is only on what was seen. The situation model-based representation requires much 
more effort because people must draw inferences and create some form of context to 
make sense of the narrative. When no textual information is available, people may start to 
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embellish on what is going on in the story to create a coherent situation model. As a 
result, unlike retrieving accurate mental representations from the text in the verbal model 
for the text-pictures and text-only groups, the pictures-only group may elaborate or use 
their situation model-based representation to help describe and connect their 
understanding of their perceptual representation. 
When examining the storage and retrieval process, people were also given 
questions during the second recall session about whether they relied on their textual or 
pictorial information to remember the story (see Appendices F and G). Based on the 
descriptive responses, the text-pictures group’s ratings were about the same on average 
(although the patterns appear to show a slightly higher rating for the pictures). Another 
slight difference in ratings was observed for the text-only and pictures-only groups. 
Specifically, based on their average ratings, the pictures-only group rated higher for using 
pictures to remember the story than the text-only group for rating their use of textual 
information for memory retrieval. This pattern may suggest that perceptual 
representations, such as images, can strengthen people’s memories, allowing the 
possibility for a picture-superiority effect. Although people are able to rely on text and 
pictures to help them remember the story, they are not necessarily resistant to normal 
forgetting. As a result, they may rely more on their schemas to help them organize details 
that could allow them to connect the story in a coherent manner. This assumption can be 
supported by the fact that the text-pictures and text-only groups recalled more false idea 
units after a two day period. The pictures-only group did not show any forgetting for 
correct recall (although they showed a floor effect in both their recall tests) and they did 
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not show an increase in elaborations, suggesting that contextual cues are very important 
to maintain accuracy. 
The Event Indexing Model 
 In Experiment 2, the Event Indexing model was incorporated into people’s 
reading and / or viewing of the story by taking their judgment responses and response 
times. Zwaan, Langston, and Graesser (1995) indicated that people simultaneously 
monitor various changes in the events of a story to help organize and form situation 
models. This dissertation focused on space, time, characters, and objects for situation 
changes in the story. From the results, while people were more likely to monitor time and 
character, people were less likely to detect changes for objects (except for the pictures-
only group in the first viewing for judgment). This finding may suggests that objects are 
not as meaningful or important in connecting information into people’s situation models 
compared to the other event dimensions. Some researchers have also found this similar 
result in their experiments, suggesting that object changes are not as recognizable if they 
do not exhibit a strong functional relationship to the story (Radvansky & Copeland, 
2000). With spatial changes, people also showed inconsistent judgments and response 
times. However, Radvansky and Copeland (2010) have argued that detecting shifts in 
space may be an automatic process because of people’s day-to-day experience in 
changing from one location to another. Therefore, people’s recognition of spatial changes 
can often come and go. 
In examining other results of the Event Indexing model, the text-pictures, text-
only, and pictures-only groups showed different patterns for judgments and response 
times in detecting the event dimensions. The findings showed that not all judgments 
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corresponded to the slowing down of response times for the event indices and vice versa. 
Sometimes, they were able to judge a situation change without slowing down in response 
times to update or connect new information with prior information in memory. At other 
times, they were able to slow down to update situation changes for certain event 
dimensions, but judgments were not observed. Time and characters were two of the event 
indices that exhibited these opposite patterns. This inconsistency questions the credibility 
of the methods used to measure the Event Indexing model. Note that the proper methods 
were performed according to how previous researchers conducted their experiments (e.g., 
Magliano et al., 2012; Zwaan et al., 1995) and so, the lack of reliability cannot be 
questioned by the procedural design of this dissertation. A possibility would be that 
people do monitor changes for events, but they do not focus on all of the event indices 
simultaneously as suggested by Zwaan and his colleagues (Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 
1995; Zwaan, Magliano, & Graesser, 1995). Rather, people are inclined to attend to 
certain situation changes because they stand out more or are more prominent in the story 
than the other situation changes. Therefore, they are able to identify those changes 
automatically through judgments instead of response times. However, further research is 
needed to understand how response times might slow down without people identifying 
those changes from judgments. Other than this dissertation, these Event Indexing model 
studies have typically used only one method or the other and not both. 
Processing Time and Efficiency Scores 
 When people are given the opportunity to read and / or view a story multiple 
times, they are likely to process the narrative longer during their first encoding than 
during a subsequent time. This result from Experiments 1 and 2 was similar to a study by 
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Zwaan et al. (1995), demonstrating that building a situation model for a story at the 
beginning is an important process for how information is stored in memory. Once details 
of people’s situation models are established, they are less likely to spend time re-
encoding the story. In general, the text-pictures group spent longer processing the 
narrative than the text-only group because the integration of both multimedia modes 
allows people to construct a better understanding of their situation models (as indicated 
by a combination of higher numbers of correct recalls as well as judgments and response 
times that corresponded to situational shifts). The text-only group had to rely on one form 
of mental representation, facilitating the effort required to create a coherent situation 
model. Based on the consistency in performance by this group, it seemed as though they 
received all of the necessary information for comprehension from the text. In contrast, 
there was a large amount of variability in processing time for the pictures-only group. 
They were slower than the other presentation groups in Experiment 1, but then they were 
faster than the other presentation groups in Experiment 2. This finding may suggest that 
when people are instructed to view the story only, people’s focus will be more on making 
sense of the pictures. However, when they are instructed to identify situation changes 
while viewing the story, they may have become frustrated with the lack of coherence 
from trying to interpret the story from the pictures in order to make situational judgments, 
and, hence, sped up their processing just to get through the task more quickly. 
 In examining the costs and benefits of reading and viewing the story with 
people’s recall, efficiency scores were generated. High efficiency scores represented 
greater accuracy with the amount of time encoding the story for the multimedia sources, 
whereas low efficiency scores represented greater elaborations with the amount of time 
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encoding the story based on the presentation modality. In Experiments 1 and 2, the text-
pictures group had the highest efficiency score followed by the text-only group, and the 
pictures-only group clearly showed the lowest efficiency score. This outcome suggests 
that although the combination of text and pictures may cost people with a slight 
slowdown in their processing time, they benefit by recalling more accurate details and 
fewer elaborations. Using both types of multimedia presentations together (i.e., text and 
pictures) might be an ideal way of comprehending the story and achieving coherence in 
memory. When only text is given, people suffer slightly in memory accuracy but not in 
elaborations because the text still provides strong contextual cues for understanding the 
story and storing information in memory. However, there was greater cost with 
presenting people with pictures only. Although they may spend longer or fewer minutes 
in processing the story (see earlier points about variability in processing times), the lack 
of context and meaningfulness of the story handicaps their ability to accurately recall 
details from memory. Pictures seem to only be helpful perceptually when more 
information is given to them about how to interpret those images. 
A Contribution to Bartlett’s (1932) The War of the Ghost Story 
 Bartlett’s (1932) work in showing that people reconstruct stories in their 
memories over time through repeated testing has been replicated for many decades. Many 
researchers (e.g., Bergman & Roediger, 1999; Gauld & Stephenson, 1967; Kellogg, 
2007; Ross & Millsom, 1970) have tested The War of the Ghost narrative in various ways 
from how information is encoded (i.e., through reading or hearing the story) to how 
information is retrieved (i.e., through speaking or writing about the story). In all of these 
studies, the findings have supported Bartlett’s concepts of schemas, rationalizations, and 
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distortions. However, little has been done to investigate other methods, such as the use of 
illustrations that are also common for presenting information today. Unlike previous 
experiments, this dissertation involved a comic book format that allowed people to form 
different mental representations as a way to remember the story. Although situation 
models can be associated with false memories, cognitive psychologists have yet to 
address how these two constructs influence each other. By using multimedia through text 
and pictures, the results provided a new direction for how situation models affect memory 
accuracy and comprehension. One important contribution of this dissertation was that, 
while text and pictures (i.e., the comic book format) can significantly increase recall of 
correct details, this format is still susceptible to elaborations / false recalls. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 In this dissertation, there were several limitations that could be explored further in 
future studies. For instance, unlike the materials used in the current experiments, comic 
book stories are typically conveyed in a non-redundant way in regard to the text and 
pictures. That is, people usually infer what is happening in the story without having the 
text and pictures represent the same information. Comic artists design illustrated 
narratives in this manner because they are able to add more information without wasting 
space in the panels (Eisner, 2008; McCloud, 1993). I experienced this firsthand when I 
first began to work with the comic artist who helped create these materials, as he often 
had a tendency to sketch drafts that were non-redundant. Some examples of being non-
redundant for The War of Ghosts story would be to show the characters fighting in a 
battle in the picture without the text repeating what is going on in the story (i.e., 
mentioning that there is a war) or to state that someone has died in the text without 
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showing the character dead in the picture. By manipulating the text and pictures of the 
panels, the findings would help clarify whether people are capable of forming separate 
mental representations in memory. 
 Along this line, another possible limitation for this study was that people were 
only tested using verbal recall. To better investigate the reliance on separate verbal and 
pictorial memory representations, versus an integrated representation, if the frames were 
altered to be  less redundant across text and pictures, then a memory test could be 
designed to examine if people could differentiate whether specific information was 
conveyed exclusively by either the text or pictures. Using this method may reveal insights 
into how people store and / or integrate information from multimedia. 
Another future direction to explore is to distinguish between perceptual and 
situation model-based representations in the pictures-only group. For example, many of 
the participants claimed that the Indians were hunting in a lake instead of a river hunting 
for animals. In the experiments, it is unclear if this was due to a true elaboration or if it 
was a misperception of the picture. By norming what people actually perceive in the 
pictures as they view them, the criteria for what is considered a correct or false idea unit 
may have changed. Specifically, there may have been a greater reduction in people’s 
elaboration for the story in the pictures-only group because the finding would 
demonstrate more of a picture superiority effect based on their actual interpretations of 
the pictures. 
The inconsistencies observed for judgments and response times in the Event 
Indexing model suggest that better methods are needed to determine whether people 
organize and store certain situation changes for space, time, characters, and objects in 
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memory. One way to avoid the same methods used in this dissertation and previous 
studies is to ask people whether there are situation changes occurring in the panels as 
they read and / or view the story. In addition, they would be asked to explicitly state what 
those changes are if they are present. By doing so, there would be a better understanding 
of whether people simultaneously monitor various event dimensions when processing the 
narrative. Thus far, there has yet to be a study implementing this type of procedure. 
Lastly, future studies should apply the cognitive theory of multimedia learning to 
other stories in a comic book format beyond reading and / or viewing The War of the 
Ghosts. Bartlett’s (1932) narrative is unique in that the structure of the story is not as 
logical and easy to follow (Mandler & Johnson, 1977). Therefore, people were prone to 
elaborating or making false memories to connect the story meaningfully. The challenge 
of comprehending a story without much coherence may also explain why people showed 
inconsistencies for judgments and response times when monitoring situation changes for 
the story. However, this assumption must also be explored. 
Conclusion 
 The ability to construct accurate situation models may be dependent on the 
multimedia presentation given. In this dissertation, the findings were assessed to expand 
on the cognitive theory of multimedia learning for narratives. When text and pictures 
were processed together, people had a stronger support system in memory to create more 
accurate mental representations than false ones. This effect was due to having better 
contextual or meaningful cues from the text that corresponded to the pictures. In addition, 
the text-only group was able to create more accurate details to their situation models 
because the context that they were given also required them to put more effort in 
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encoding specific details of their mental images in memory. Although the text-pictures 
and text-only groups were able to recall more correct idea units, these two presentation 
groups were still prone to normal forgetting due to the lack of retrieval cues available 
across the recall tests. As a result, they were still likely to elaborate on information over 
time on certain ideas that they may have forgotten. As for the pictures-only group, they 
exhibited low memory accuracy, high elaborations, variability in response times, and 
inability to clearly identify situational shifts. Because they were only able to rely on their 
perceptual representation, they needed to interpret the pictures in their own way to make 
sense of the narrative across the two recall tests. Overall, the organization and formation 
of situation models may be influenced by the type of multimedia source given, causing 
people’s accurate and false memories to vary. 
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Appendix A 
The Cognitive Theory of Multimedia Learning 
 
 
Image was taken from Mayer (2005). 
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Appendix B 
An Example of the Presentation Modalities 
Text-Only Group: 
One night, two young men from Egulac went down to the river to hunt seals… 
Pictures-Only Group: 
 
Text-Pictures Group: 
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Appendix C 
Recall Instructions 
Text-Only Group: 
Please type up the story you read [previously / two days ago] in the space below 
as best as you can. Please try to reproduce it exactly. It is very important that you 
be as precise as you can. Try to use exactly the same words as they appeared in 
the story as much as possible. Where you cannot remember the exact wording, be 
sure to at least get the facts and events exactly correct. Do not invent facts to 
make it a better story; imagine that you are giving a statement to a policeman and 
accuracy is important. If you cannot remember something, don’t guess. When you 
are through, please notify the experimenter that you are done. 
Pictures-Only Group: 
Please type up the picture story you viewed [previously / two days ago] in the 
space below as best as you can. Please try to reproduce it exactly. It is very 
important that you be as precise as you can. Try to remember the details of each 
picture as they appeared in the story as much as possible. Do not invent facts to 
make it a better story; imagine that you are giving a statement to a policeman and 
accuracy is important. If you cannot remember something, don’t guess. When you 
are through, please notify the experimenter that you are done. 
Text-Pictures Group: 
Please type up the story you read [previously / two days ago] in the space below 
as best as you can. Please try to reproduce it exactly. It is very important that you 
be as precise as you can. Try to use exactly the same words as they appeared in 
the story as much as possible. Where you cannot remember the exact wording, be 
sure to at least get the facts and events exactly correct. Do not invent facts to 
make it a better story; imagine that you are giving a statement to a policeman and 
accuracy is important. If you cannot remember something, don’t guess. When you 
are through, please notify the experimenter that you are done. 
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Appendix D 
The Illustrated Narrative 
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Appendix E 
Standardizing Beta Coefficients for Logistic Regression 
 
Cell A1 = Enter the mean predicted probability for the dataset 
Cell A2 = Enter the unstandardized beta weight for the predictor 
Cell A3 = Enter the sample standard deviation for the predictor 
Cell A4 = Calculate the standardized coefficient for the predictor using the following 
formula: 
=(1/(1+EXP(-(LN(A1/(1-A1))+0.5*A2*A3))))-(1/(1+EXP(-(LN(A1/(1-A1))-
0.5*A2*A3)))) 
Repeat for each participant and predictor. 
 
This formula for Microsoft Excel was taken from King (2007, p. 9). 
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Appendix F 
Reflection Questions for Experiment 1 
Numbers in parentheses represent the values of the rating responses. 
Text-Pictures Group 
Recall Session 1: 
When presented with the story, how much attention did you give to processing the words? 
 
Mean Rating Response = 3.85 
When presented with the story, how much attention did you give to processing the pictures? 
 
Mean Rating Response = 3.85 
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Recall Session 2: 
How much did you rely on the words from the story to help you remember? 
 
Mean Rating Response = 3.70 
How much did you rely on the pictures from the story to help you remember? 
 
Mean Rating Response = 3.85 
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Text-Only Group 
Recall Session 1: 
When presented with the story, how much attention did you give to processing the words? 
 
Mean Rating Response = 3.85 
 
Recall Session 2: 
How much did you rely on the words from the story to help you remember? 
 
Mean Rating Response = 3.50 
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Pictures-Only Group 
Recall Session 1: 
When presented with the story, how much attention did you give to processing the pictures? 
 
Mean Rating Response = 4.35 
 
Recall Session 2: 
How much did you rely on the pictures from the story to help you remember? 
 
Mean Rating Response = 4.40 
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Appendix G 
Reflection Questions for Experiment 2 
Numbers in the parentheses represent the values of the rating responses. 
Text-Pictures Group 
Recall Session 1: 
When presented with the story, how much attention did you give to processing the words? 
 
Mean Rating Response = 3.45 
When presented with the story, how much attention did you give to processing the pictures? 
 
Mean Rating Response = 3.75 
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Recall Session 2: 
How much did you rely on the words from the story to help you remember? 
 
Mean Rating Response = 3.40 
How much did you rely on the pictures from the story to help you remember? 
 
Mean Rating Response = 3.90 
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Text-Only Group 
Recall Session 1: 
When presented with the story, how much attention did you give to processing the words? 
 
Mean Rating Response = 3.30 
 
Recall Session 2: 
How much did you rely on the words from the story to help you remember? 
 
Mean Rating Response = 3.10 
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Pictures-Only Group 
Recall Session 1: 
When presented with the story, how much attention did you give to processing the pictures? 
 
Mean Rating Response = 3.75 
 
Recall Session 2: 
How much did you rely on the pictures from the story to help you remember? 
 
Mean Rating Response = 4.10 
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